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RECONCILING ORIGINALISM AND THE 
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE 
Emily A. Johnson* 
 
The history of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is virtually 
nonexistent.  For at least the last century, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted its public use language broadly, allowing takings for the 
purposes of rectifying urban blight, facilitating land redistribution, and 
most recently, in Kelo v. City of New London, promoting economic benefit.  
In that case, Justice Thomas dissented vigorously, arguing that the Kelo 
Court had strayed from the original meaning of public use and urging it to 
return to requiring actual use by the public when property is condemned. 
In light of Justice Thomas’s argument that the Court had abandoned the 
original meaning of the Takings Clause, this Note considers whether 
historical evidence regarding original meaning provides a coherent 
limiting principle.  Particularly in the area of property expropriations, the 
historical record does not indicate that the founding generation had a 
concrete conception of the extent to which the right should be protected.  As 
a result, scholarship on both sides of the public use debate presents the best 
evidence supporting its particular thesis, but no piece satisfactorily 
incorporates all of the historical evidence.  In light of these considerations, 
this Note concludes by proposing how to reconcile originalism as a method 
of Constitutional interpretation for a text with an essentially unattainable 
original meaning and over a hundred years of case law divorced from an 
originalist analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[Justice Thomas] doesn’t believe in stare decisis, period.  If a 
constitutional line of authority is wrong, he would say let’s get it right.” 
 –Justice Scalia1 
 
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo v. City of New London2 perfectly 
illustrates Justice Scalia’s aforementioned observations.  For the last 
century, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the public use 
language of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause3 broadly.4  In Kelo, 
Justice Thomas advocated abandoning this precedent and returning to 
requiring use by the public when property is condemned, his view of the 
Clause’s original meaning.5  In light of Justice Thomas’s argument that the 
Kelo majority abandoned the original meaning of the Clause, this Note asks 
if originalism provides a satisfactory methodology for interpreting public 
use, an area where even purported originalists (like Justice Scalia) are not 
consistently originalist.6  Finally, this Note addresses the viability of 
originalism as a method of Constitutional interpretation where the original 
meaning of the text is essentially unattainable7 and in which over a century 
of case law has refrained from an originalist analysis.8 
Before Kelo, the Court unanimously decided Berman v. Parker9 and 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,10 earlier cases addressing the 
 
 1. Jonathan Ringel, Thomas Bio Reveals Surprising Philosophy, DAILY REP., Aug. 2, 
2004, at 1. 
 2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 3. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).  This Note refers to the language “for public use” 
as the Public Use Clause. 
 4. See infra Part II.A–B.1. This Note refers to a broad interpretation of the Public Use 
Clause as an interpretation that includes public benefit in the idea of public use and a narrow 
interpretation as literally requiring use by the public. 
 5. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  No other Justice joined Justice 
Thomas’s dissent. Id. at 505; see also infra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing the 
inconsistencies in Justice Thomas’s definition of public use, as he alternated between 
requiring that the public actually use the taken property and requiring only that the public 
have a legal right to use the property).  This Note focuses on the actual use requirement, as 
the legal right to use property is a less stringent requirement that can overlap with purely 
private takings. See infra note 130.  For a detailed discussion of Justice Thomas’s dissent, 
see infra Part II.B.3. 
 6. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 858 (1995) (“[E]ven originalists such as 
Black and Scalia are not originalists when it comes to the Takings Clause.”); see also infra 
notes 446–49 and accompanying text (explaining that the doctrine of compensation for 
regulatory takings is not based on the original meaning of the Takings Clause). 
 7. See infra Parts III–V. 
 8. See infra Part II.A–B.1 (showing that the last century of public use jurisprudence has 
relied on precedent, not a textual, structural, or historical analysis of the Takings Clause). 
 9. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).  In Berman, eight members of the Court unanimously held that 
property could be taken for the public purpose of rectifying urban blight. Id. at 36.  Justice 
Robert Jackson did not participate in the decision as he passed away prior to oral argument. 
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limitations of the Public Use Clause.  By allowing takings for the 
rectification of urban blight in Berman and the facilitation of land 
redistribution in Midkiff, the Court held that these public benefits satisfied 
the Public Use Clause.  The Court continued development of the public 
benefit idea in Kelo by holding that takings for economic development also 
satisfied the Clause’s strictures.11  Unlike the decisions in Berman and 
Midkiff, the Kelo ruling ignited a firestorm of controversy from all sides of 
the political spectrum.12  Even Justice John Paul Stevens, the author of the 
majority opinion, “issued something like an apology.”13  Legally, though, 
Kelo does not deviate from Supreme Court public use precedent.14 
The state’s power to take private property through eminent domain 
highlights the tension between individual rights and government power.15  
In response to Kelo’s four vigorous dissenters, one scholar noted, “[T]here 
are very few instances of Justices so directly challenging the philosophical 
trend of the Court’s decisions.”16 
 
See The Life of Robert H. Jackson, ROBERT H. JACKSON CENTER, 
http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 10. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  In Midkiff, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing 
unanimously for eight members of the Court, held the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit 
takings for the purpose of eliminating concentrated property ownership. Id. at 245.  Justice 
Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the Midkiff decision. Id.  Following Midkiff, Justice 
O’Connor also dissented in Kelo, arguing that the majority’s decision effectively removed 
the Public Use Clause from the Fifth Amendment. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  For a discussion of Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, see infra Part II.B.2. 
 11. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90. 
 12. Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (To Public), N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at WK3 
(“The decision provoked outrage from Democrats and Republicans, liberals and libertarians, 
and everyone betwixt and between.”); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The 
Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1413 (2006) (“Everyone hates 
Kelo.”). 
 13. Liptak, supra note 12. 
 14. See Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
151, 164 (2009) (“[T]here is little doubt that the decision is consistent with . . . Berman v. 
Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.”); John M. Zuck, Note, Kelo v. City of 
New London:  Despite the Outcry, the Decision is Firmly Supported by Precedent—
However, Eminent Domain Critics Still Have Gained Ground, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 187, 229-
30 (2007) (“The Kelo decision was correct despite the criticism . . . .  [F]rustration should be 
aimed at the entire history of eminent domain decisions . . . not with Kelo, a decision that did 
not itself change or expand the law.”); see also Part II.A (discussing pre-Kelo public use 
jurisprudence). 
 15. See, e.g., James W. Ely Jr., “Poor Relation” Once More:  The Supreme Court and 
the Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 53 (“Eminent 
domain is one of the most intrusive powers of government because it compels individual 
owners, without their consent, to relinquish their property.”).  This conflict between the 
individual and the state has been central throughout American history.  See infra Part 
IV.A.1–2 for a discussion of how classical liberalism and republicanism, philosophies that 
influenced early Americans, interpreted the balance between protecting individual rights 
while allowing for necessary state interference. 
 16. Timothy Sandefur, Mine and Thine Distinct:  What Kelo Says About Our Path, 10 
CHAP. L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2006). 
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For Justice Thomas, originalism provides the grounds for a total 
reexamination of precedent.17  In response to his Kelo dissent, this Note 
asks whether historical evidence regarding the meaning of the Public Use 
Clause at the time of its drafting and ratification provides a coherent 
limitation.18  To do so, this Note begins by examining original meaning as a 
method of constitutional interpretation.19  Next, this Note outlines the last 
century of Supreme Court public use jurisprudence, highlighting the 
methodologies employed by the Justices.20 
The following three parts detail the history of “public use,” focusing on 
the sources originalists review to discover the original meaning of a phrase.  
As a starting point, this Note examines the etymology of the phrase and the 
structure and placement of the Takings Clause in the Bill of Rights.21  Next, 
this Note details the drafting and ratification of the Clause, focusing in 
particular on the philosophies of the eighteenth century political climate and 
the realities of early America.22  This Note then explores how courts first 
interpreted public use restrictions like the one at issue in Kelo.23  
Throughout, this Note cites legal and historical scholarship to show that 
opinions vary considerably as to whether the Public Use Clause originally 
provided an occasional limit24 or a literal limit25 to the takings power. 
Finally, this Note touches on another area of eminent domain law, 
regulatory takings, where the Supreme Court has abandoned using original 
meaning to interpret the Takings Clause.26  This Note concludes that the 
absence of a satisfactory interpretation of the original meaning of “public 
use” cautions against using a strict originalist interpretation, like the one 
Justice Thomas proposed in his Kelo dissent.27  Indeed, this Note suggests 
that originalist interpretation in a historical grey area may even be 
intellectually disingenuous because it fails to connect modern jurisprudence 
with “what the American People meant and did when We ratified and 
amended the document.” 28  This Note closes by proposing that even though 
originalism is not an appropriate mode of interpretation in this instance, the 
opinions in Kelo and its predecessors nonetheless remain faithful to the 
 
 17. See infra Part I for a discussion of originalism as a judicial philosophy.  This Note 
focuses on the school of originalism associated with ascertaining the original public meaning 
of the constitutional text at issue, not the original intent of the founders. See infra notes 30–
32 and accompanying text (clarifying the differences between original meaning and original 
intent). 
 18. Historical analysis is relevant to the question of original meaning because, along 
with text and structure, history and context can reveal the meaning of a particular clause. See 
infra notes 197–199 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra Part I. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. See infra Parts III.B, IV.C, V.B. 
 25. See infra Parts III.C, IV.D, V.C. 
 26. See infra Part VI.A. 
 27. See infra Part VI.B. 
 28. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword:  The Document 
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000); infra Part VI.B. 
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ideals of early Americans, thereby fulfilling one of the methodology’s key 
goals.29 
I. ORIGINALISM 
Part I examines the judicial philosophy of originalism.  In particular, it 
explains how judges uncover the original public meaning of constitutional 
text, a methodology distinct from the branch of originalism focused on 
ascertaining the founders’ original intent.30  Indeed, original intent has been 
criticized for being an indeterminate and speculative exercise, as well as a 
practice antithetical to the framers’ actual intent.31  These criticisms of 
original intent, however, do not discredit the school of originalism 
associated with the search for original meaning.32  Accordingly, Part I 
discusses the tools originalist jurists and scholars employ in practice, 
explains both the criticisms and benefits of the methodology, and touches 
on the relationship between originalism and stare decisis. 
Originalism as a mode of constitutional interpretation is closely 
associated with the approaches taken by current Supreme Court Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, as well as other academics and commentators like 
former Judge Robert Bork.33  While many associate originalism with a 
more conservative philosophy, be it judicial or political, there are many 
politically liberal scholars, like Professor Akhil Amar, who advocate for an 
originalist approach to Constitutional interpretation.34 
 
 29. See infra Part VI.B; see also infra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that 
originalism connects modern jurisprudence to the decisions the founding generation made 
when drafting the Constitution and Bill of Rights). 
 30. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 7–11 (1996) (clarifying the differences between original meaning and 
original intent).  Examining other methods of Constitutional interpretation is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  Moreover, in practice judges frequently employ a mix of interpretive 
techniques.  As this Note uses the purely originalist approach of Justice Thomas’s Kelo 
dissent as a starting point for inquiry into the limitations of the philosophy, actual judicial 
practice also exceeds the scope of discussion. 
 31. William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously:  Modern Textualism, Original 
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 496–97 (2007) 
(“[T]he original understanding was that original understanding was irrelevant.” (citing H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 
(1985))). 
 32. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 725 (1988) (“[T]he critics are wrong in believing that in discrediting 
intentionalism, they discredit originalism.  The relevant inquiry must focus on the public 
understanding of the language when the Constitution was developed.”). 
 33. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Amar, supra 
note 28; Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION]; Antonin Scalia, Foreword to ORIGINALISM:  A QUARTER-
CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi, ed., 2007) [hereinafter ORIGINALISM]; Antonin 
Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 34. Treanor, supra note 31, at 491. 
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Proponents of this approach seek to ascertain the original meaning of 
Constitutional text.35  Specifically, the original meaning scholars and judges 
seek is “how the words used in the Constitution would have been 
understood at the time [of the document’s drafting and ratification].”36  To 
uncover this meaning, an originalist examines the definitions of individual 
words in the text,37 the structure of the Constitutional clause, and all 
relevant history—such as the ratification debates, tracts like The Federalist, 
contemporary treatises, early judicial interpretations, and the like.38 
Proponents of originalism argue that it constrains judicial decision 
making by anchoring it to a set of rules and a distinct methodology—
textual, structural, and historical analysis—thus limiting the influence of an 
interpreter’s personal beliefs.39 For example, Justice Scalia defends 
originalism by explaining that “[w]ords do have a limited range of 
meaning,” insisting that “no interpretation that goes beyond that range is 
permissible.”40  He does admit, though, that originalists may not always 
agree on a single interpretation.41 
 
 35. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 33, at 144 (“What is the meaning of a rule that judges 
should not change?  It is the meaning understood at the time of the law’s enactment. . . . All 
that counts is how the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the 
time.”); Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 38 (“What I look for in the 
Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute:  the original meaning of the text, not 
what the original draftsmen intended.”). 
 36. BORK, supra note 33, at 144. 
 37. Critically examining the text of the Constitution itself, a technique some refer to as 
textualism, is one of the key tools scholars use to discover the original meaning of the 
document. Amar, supra note 28, at 28–29 (“[T]extual analysis dovetails with the study of 
enactment history and constitutional structure.  The joint aim of these related approaches is 
to understand what the American People meant and did when We ratified and amended the 
document.”).  Although some scholars refer to the term “textualism” more broadly as the 
branch of originalism associated with the search for original meaning, see Treanor, supra 
note 31, at 496, this Note refers to textualism as a method by which the original meaning 
may be discovered through an examination of the definition and placement of words. 
 38. See BORK, supra note 33, at 165; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The 
President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994) (describing a four-
step methodology for ascertaining original meaning); Michael B. Rappaport, The Original 
Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1493–95 (2005) 
(noting interpreters at the time of the founding would have looked to factors like “text, 
purpose, structure, and history”); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY, INTERPRETING 
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 7–8 (2005) (noting all judges use these same basic 
interpretive tools but place differing levels of emphasis on each). 
 39. David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299, 
299–300 (2005); Treanor, supra note 6, at 856. 
 40. Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 24; see also Michael B. 
Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism:  The Proper Textual Basis of the 
Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 823 
(1999) (explaining that the interpretation harmonizing ambiguous text with the rest of the 
Constitution should be preferred). 
 41. Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 45 (“I do not suggest, mind 
you, that originalists always agree upon their answer.  There is plenty of room for 
disagreement as to what original meaning was, and even more as to how that original 
meaning applies to the situation before the court.  But the originalist at least knows what he 
is looking for:  the original meaning of the text.  Often—indeed, I dare say usually—that is 
easy to discern and simple to apply.”). But see Monaghan, supra note 32, at 726 
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Proponents also argue that originalism prevents the judiciary from 
exerting power belonging to other branches of government.42  Further, by 
interpreting the Constitution in accordance with the original meaning of the 
text to the founding generation, originalism connects modern judicial 
interpretation with decision making at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights.43 
Critics, on the other hand, point out that judicial interpretation has always 
been, at least in part, an exercise of discretion.44  While advocates of 
originalism assert that it depoliticizes interpretation, Justice William 
Brennan disagreed, claiming that it ignores political and social reality:  
“Those who would restrict claims of right to the values of 1789 . . . turn a 
blind eye to social progress and eschew adaptation of overarching principles 
to changes of social circumstance.”45 
Critics of originalism also note that the Constitution does not claim its 
text is the sole point of reference in interpreting its guarantees.46  Nor, they 
argue, did the framers explain how the Constitution should be interpreted or 
whether its meaning should be frozen at the time of the founding.47  Finally, 
for purely pragmatic reasons, these critics insist that searching for original 
meaning is an intellectually difficult and indeterminate process that “leaves 
too many things too wide open and suppresses too many important 
considerations.”48 
The relationship between original meaning and stare decisis can be tricky 
for originalists.49  For example, a longstanding interpretation of a particular 
 
(“[O]riginalism must refer to an understanding concrete enough to provide a real and 
constraining guidance.”). 
 42. See Monaghan, supra note 32, at 723.  Professor Alexander Bickel famously termed 
this ability of unelected judges to overturn legislative acts passed by the prevailing majority 
the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962). 
 43. Monaghan, supra note 32, at 723; Treanor, supra note 6, at 856; see also RAKOVE, 
supra note 30, at 9 (“[T]he argument that the original meaning, once recovered, should be 
binding . . . insists that original meaning should prevail—regardless of intervening revisions, 
deviations, and the judicial doctrine of stare decisis—because the authority of the 
Constitution as supreme law rests on its ratification by the special, popularly elected 
conventions of 1787–88.”). 
 44. See Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 
49, 59. 
 45. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium at 
Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 55, 59. 
 46. See BREYER, supra note 38, at 117; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 65, 77–78. 
 47. See BREYER, supra note 38, at 117; Tribe, supra note 46, at 77–78. 
 48. David Strauss, Professor, The University of Chicago Law School, Panel on 
Originalism and Precedent at the 2005 Federalist Society Lawyers Conference (Nov. 12, 
2005), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 217, 218, 220 [hereinafter Strauss Remarks] (“[I]t 
is very, very hard to do originalism right, even when you have every incentive to do it right, 
and the chances of getting it wrong—even in something like ideal circumstances, the 
chances of getting it wrong are very great.”); see also BREYER, supra note 38, at 124 (noting 
that text, structure, and history often fail to provide objective guidance). 
 49. See Monaghan, supra note 32, at 727.  Stare decisis is defined as, “The doctrine of 
precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when 
the same points arise again in litigation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (8th ed. 2004). 
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Constitutional clause may vary from its original meaning.50  Originalists as 
a group are not always strict about when original meaning should prevail 
over precedent.  While most accept a version of stare decisis,51 others argue 
there is no Constitutional text mandating that precedent should always 
triumph.52  Professor Steven Calabresi argues that, for policy reasons, 
following a strict rule of stare decisis would make it difficult to correct 
Supreme Court decisions due to the practical difficulties of amending the 
Constitution.53 
On the other hand, Professor David Strauss takes the opposite position—
that precedent is a better limiting principle for judicial overreaching than 
original meaning—because he believes moral and social judgments 
inevitably enter judicial decision making.54  Judges who rely on precedent 
must be candid about when personal beliefs enter an opinion, whereas 
originalists, he argues, “must insist that all they are doing is implementing 
judgments made by someone else.”55  Further, relying on precedent 
demonstrates respect for the rule of law, shows judicial restraint, and 
illustrates the idea that important decisions should be made by elected 
representatives.56 
In practice, originalism is only one way to approach interpreting the 
Constitution.  In Kelo, however, Justice Thomas’s dissent squarely rejected 
precedent in favor of original meaning, thereby providing a rare opportunity 
to examine how originalism and precedent interact when the historical 
record is sparse and frequently contradictory.57 
 
 50. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 32, at 727–39 (citing current interpretations of civil 
liberties and structural issues like federalism, the separation of powers doctrine, and the 
power of the presidency as instances where “the existing constitutional order is at variance 
with what we know of the original understanding”). 
 51. See Tribe, supra note 46, at 82; see also Akhil Amar, Professor, Yale Law School, 
Panel on Originalism and Precedent at the 2005 Federalist Society Lawyers Conference 
(Nov. 12, 2005), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 210, 215 (proposing that, like the 
presumption of a statute’s constitutionality, there should be a presumption that the Court will 
follow its precedent). 
 52. Steven G. Calabresi, Professor, Northwestern Law School, Panel on Originalism and 
Precedent at the 2005 Federalist Society Lawyers Conference (Nov. 12, 2005), in 
ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 199, 200 [hereinafter Calabresi Remarks]; see infra note 158 
(quoting Justice Thomas as saying that original meaning should prevail over precedent).  
Originalists of this view point out that the Supremacy Clause makes the Constitution the 
supreme law of the land. Id. But see Thomas W. Merrill, Professor, Columbia Law School, 
Panel on Originalism and Precedent at the 2005 Federalist Society Lawyers Conference 
(Nov. 12, 2005), in ORIGINALISM, supra note 33, at 223, 224 [hereinafter Merrill Remarks] 
(arguing that starting from an originalist interpretation leaves no room for stare decisis at 
all). 
 53. Calabresi Remarks, supra note 52, at 206–07. 
 54. See Strauss Remarks, supra note 48, at 220–22; Strauss, supra note 39, at 301. 
 55. Strauss, supra note 39, at 301. 
 56. See Merrill Remarks, supra note 52, at 223–24; Monaghan, supra note 32, at 748.  
While Constitutional text and statements of the framers do appear in opinions, studies show 
that approximately eighty percent of the authorities cited by courts are other precedents. 
Merrill Remarks, supra note 52, at 224–25. 
 57. See infra Parts III–V. 
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II. RECENT SUPREME COURT PUBLIC USE JURISPRUDENCE 
Part II focuses on the last century of Supreme Court public use 
jurisprudence.  It begins by briefly examining cases the Kelo majority cited 
when it held that public benefit from economic development satisfied the 
Public Use Clause.58  Notably, these pre-Kelo cases interpreted public use 
broadly by relying on precedent, not by engaging in the textual, structural, 
or historical analyses associated with an originalist approach.  Part II closes 
by reviewing the Kelo majority opinion, as well as Justice O’Connor’s and 
Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinions,59 focusing on the interpretive 
methods guiding each of the analyses.60 
A. Pre-Kelo Jurisprudence 
When it upheld the constitutionality of takings for the purpose of 
economic development, the Kelo majority relied on earlier decisions 
interpreting the Public Use Clause.61  Beginning near the turn of the 
twentieth century,62 the Court upheld takings without engaging in a 
historical analysis of the original meaning of the Clause.63  The early public 
use cases are particularly interesting for the historical context in which they 
arose.  Despite the post-Civil War focus on individual rights,64 the Court at 
the time allowed takings where the expropriation benefited the community 
at large and disadvantaged individual landowners. 
In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,65 for example, the Court 
upheld a law providing municipal corporations the ability to condemn land 
 
 58. See infra Part II.A. 
 59. Justice Kennedy’s fifth vote concurrence in Kelo focuses on how to determine if a 
justification for the use of eminent domain is pretext. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469, 490–93 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  As Justice Kennedy does not weigh in 
on original meaning, discussion of his concurrence is outside the scope of this Note. 
 60. See infra Part II.B. 
 61. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480–89; see infra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
 62. The Court’s nineteenth century decision regarding a Mill Act statute in Head v. 
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885), also embraced a broad interpretation of public use. 
See infra notes 385–88 and accompanying text (discussing Head in the context of the other 
Mill Act cases). 
 63. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 64. See, e.g., Expert Report of Eric Foner, Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. 
Mich. 1998) (No. 97-75231), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) 
(No. 97-75928), available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/
expert/foner.html (“Reconstruction represented less a fulfillment of the Revolution’s 
principles than a radical repudiation of the nation’s actual practice for the previous seven 
decades. . . .  The underlying principles—that the federal government possessed the power to 
define and protect citizens’ rights . . . were striking departures in American law.”); AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, at xiii (1998) 
(“Reconstruction . . . transformed the nature of the original Bill of Rights, leaving us with 
something much closer to the Bill as conventionally understood today [as overwhelmingly 
about individual rights].”); Eric Foner, The Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment:  A 
Conversation with Eric Foner, 6 NEV. L.J. 425, 428 (Winter 2005/2006) (arguing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment established a principle of individual equality). 
 65. 164 U.S. 112 (1896). 
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for the establishment of irrigation districts.66  In particular, the Court noted 
the law satisfied a “public purpose” since “[i]t is not essential that the entire 
community . . . should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in 
order to constitute a public use.”67  Later in Clark v. Nash,68 the Court cited 
Bradley when holding a private individual could condemn a neighbor’s land 
for irrigation purposes.69  In a later case, the Court relied on Clark when it 
affirmed a mining corporation’s right to condemn property for an aerial 
bucket line.70  There, the Court explained the “use by the general public” 
test was inadequate for determining what constituted a public use.71 
In Bradley, Clark, and Strickley, the Court acknowledged that 
determining which activities qualified as public uses varied by location.72  
The Court also mentioned efficiencies, worrying that not allowing the 
takings would result in high transaction costs that could stunt economic 
growth.73  Despite the prevailing rhetoric of individual rights,74 public 
welfare concerns necessitated individual concessions.75  Notably, none of 
these decisions engaged in a historical analysis to ascertain the original 
meaning of public use to the founding generation.76 
Fifty years later in Berman v. Parker,77 the Court, faced with the question 
of whether urban redevelopment constituted a public use, echoed the same 
concerns expressed earlier in Bradley, Clark, and Strickley.  In particular, 
the Court discussed the transaction costs associated with any 
comprehensive redevelopment plan that could not rely on the power of 
eminent domain.78  Citing these precedents, the Court upheld the taking for 
the purpose of slum clearance.79 
Specifically at issue in Berman was a challenge to the constitutionality of 
legislation authorizing takings for the elimination of urban blight in 
 
 66. Id. at 160–61.  The state constitution at issue provided that apportioning water, 
including for use in irrigation, qualified as a public use. Id. at 159 (citing CAL. CONST. art. 
10, § 5). 
 67. Id. at 161–62. 
 68. 198 U.S. 361 (1905). 
 69. Id. at 369–70.  Like in Bradley, the Utah statute at issue in Clark authorized the 
taking as satisfying a public use. Id. 
 70. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 529, 531 (1906).  
Strickley concerned the same Utah statute at issue in Clark that considered takings furthering 
mining activities public uses. Id. at 530–31. 
 71. Id. at 531. 
 72. Id.; Clark, 198 U.S. at 369; Bradley, 164 U.S. at 159–60. 
 73. Bradley, 164 U.S. at 161; see also infra notes 78, 84 (noting the Berman Court 
mentioned the same transaction cost concerns). 
 74. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 75. Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531. 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 529–32 (noting that the question is answered by the Clark decision); 
Clark, 198 U.S. at 367–70 (relying on Bradley when allowing the taking); Bradley, 164 U.S. 
at 151–78 (failing to analyze the history of public use). 
 77. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 78. Id. at 33–35. 
 79. Id.  In the 1950s, slum clearance was a national movement, and the Court cited 
statistics suggesting the majority of the dwellings in the blighted area were uninhabitable. Id. 
at 30. 
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Washington, D.C.80  A department store owner located in the area slated for 
redevelopment objected to the taking of his non-blighted property for 
transfer to a private agency for eventual private use.81  In its opinion, the 
Court held that improving public welfare satisfied the public use 
requirement.82  As a result of the decision, the legislature could determine 
the appropriate means by which to execute a redevelopment project.83  The 
Court worried that if owners of non-blighted properties could successfully 
resist takings, comprehensive community development plans would be 
nearly impossible.84 
When validating a taking for public welfare purposes in Berman, the 
Court continued to rely on precedent to interpret the Public Use Clause.85  
In its next public use challenge, the Court upheld legislation allowing a 
private agency to use eminent domain to break up land oligopolies in 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.86  Whereas Berman repeated the 
concerns regarding transaction costs discussed in earlier cases, Midkiff 
echoed Berman’s deference to legislative determinations on public use.87 
As before, the Midkiff Court did not explore the original meaning of the 
Public Use Clause but rather relied on precedent.  In defining public use, 
the Court cited Berman for the proposition that legislative findings are 
nearly sacrosanct.88  Specifically, when a legislature decides to exercise the 
takings power, “courts must defer to its determination that the taking will 
serve a public use.”89  Further, the Court noted that a private individual’s 
possession of taken land does not necessarily render the taking non-
public.90  Most importantly, the Court summed up the cases beginning with 
Bradley when it stressed that it had “long ago rejected any literal 
 
 80. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28–30.  The legislation created a private agency tasked with 
using eminent domain to acquire property, after which the agency could transfer parcels to 
private developers who promised to complete the approved redevelopment plan. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 33; see also Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s 
Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 265 (2006) (noting that the 
Court’s detailed description of the blight in Berman made it hard for critics to condemn the 
opinion). 
 83. Berman, 348 U.S. at 34 (“We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of 
promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.”). 
 84. Id. at 34–35; see also Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand:  Economic 
Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 204 (2007) (noting that one 
of the most common justifications for economic development takings is the difficulties 
associated with assembling a large amount of property owned by numerous individuals, 
some of whom may hold out and gain the power either to block a project or to extract a 
prohibitively high price for the land). 
 85. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 33–36.  The Berman Court saw the role of the judiciary in 
policing the power of eminent domain as extremely narrow. Id. at 32. 
 86. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  In Hawaii, the Polynesian immigrants who settled the islands 
created a system whereby the high chief controlled all land, doling it out to lower ranking 
citizens.  All land was eventually returned to the high chief, thus eliminating private 
ownership. Id. at 232.  As a result, land oligopolies prevailed into the twentieth century, 
significantly increasing land prices and skewing the market for private property. Id. 
 87. Id. at 239–40, 244; see also supra note 85. 
 88. Id. at 239–40 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 32–33). 
 89. Id. at 244. 
 90. Id. at 243–44. 
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requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general 
public.”91 
Midkiff held that takings, by private parties for the purpose of land 
redistribution, did not constitute a naked transfer of property, thereby 
setting the stage for Kelo.92  As compared to Berman, where the Court 
associated the taking with increasing public welfare,93 Midkiff explicitly 
addressed the meaning of public use when it rejected outright the literal 
interpretation.94  When the Court discarded this narrow view, the opinion 
relied on precedent, not a historical, structural, or textual analysis of public 
use.95 
B. Kelo v. City of New London96 
Similarly, in upholding the taking at issue, the Kelo majority relied on 
public use precedent, rather than grounding the opinion in textual, 
structural, or historical analyses.97  Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion 
took a different approach, largely focusing on upholding Berman and 
Midkiff while distinguishing Kelo.98  In contrast to the majority, however, 
she did use historical evidence of original meaning to support her 
argument.99  Finally, Justice Thomas’s dissent marked a departure in public 
use jurisprudence by interpreting the Public Use Clause in a purely 
originalist fashion.100 
1. The Majority Opinion 
Residents of New London, Connecticut challenged the condemnation of 
their homes pursuant to the city’s redevelopment plan, arguing that 
economic development did not satisfy the Public Use Clause.101  In a five to 
four decision, with a fifth-vote concurrence by Justice Kennedy, Justice 
Stevens writing for the majority held that the eminent domain power 
 
 91. Id. at 244 (“[I]t is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass 
scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.”).  In his Kelo dissent, Justice Thomas agreed that the 
Court had long ago rejected this literal requirement, but argued that adhering to this 
precedent had divorced the public use case law from its original meaning. Kelo v. City of 
New London, 545 U.S. 469, 514 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court adopted its 
modern reading blindly, with little discussion of the Clause’s history and original meaning . . 
. in cases adopting the ‘public purpose’ interpretation . . . and . . . in cases deferring to 
legislatures’ judgments regarding what constitutes a valid public purpose.”). 
 92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 93. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
 94. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243–44. 
 95. Id.  As discussed above, Berman also relied on earlier cases that failed to analyze 
original meaning. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
 96. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 97. See infra Part II.B.1; see also infra note 158 (containing Justice Thomas’s 
disapproval of the majority’s reliance on public use precedent). 
 98. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 99. See infra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
 100. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 101. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.  After years of economic decline, Pfizer’s decision to open a 
plant in the area spurred the project to capitalize on new jobs, tax revenue, and general urban 
revitalization. Id. at 473–75. 
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extended to takings for this purpose.102  In response, state legislatures 
immediately passed new eminent domain legislation containing more 
stringent limitations.103 
In evaluating the plan’s constitutionality, the Court relied on the 
Bradley,104 Clark,105 and Strickley106 precedents establishing the broad 
public purpose standard, rather than the literal test of use by the public.107  
Also citing the comprehensiveness of the redevelopment plan and the 
deference to legislative determinations discussed in Berman and Midkiff, 
the Court concluded that the economic development served a public 
purpose, thereby satisfying the Fifth Amendment’s requirements.108 
The majority began by noting that two propositions were clear:  first, the 
government could not take the property from A for the sole purpose of 
transferring it to B, another private party,109 but second, the government 
could transfer property from one private party to another if the taking’s 
purpose were “use by the public.”110  Here, the Court explained that since 
the takings were exacted pursuant to a “carefully considered” development 
plan, the condemnations would not benefit a particular group of 
individuals.111  The Court relied on Berman and Midkiff for the idea that 
legislative determinations of the viability of a comprehensive plan, as 
 
 102. Id. at 489–90.  Notably, the Court emphasized that the ruling did not limit the states 
from placing greater restrictions on the takings power. Id. at 489; see also infra note 103 and 
accompanying text. 
 103. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Post-Kelo Reform:  Is the Glass Half Full or Half 
Empty?, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 133 (2009) (stating that post-Kelo, only eight states 
did not enact eminent domain reform that limited its exercise for economic development 
purposes); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2102 (2009) (noting that Kelo resulted in new eminent domain 
legislation in forty-three states, a response greater than any other Supreme Court decision). 
 104. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896). 
 105. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). 
 106. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906). 
 107. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 & n.9 (citations omitted) (“[W]hen this Court began applying 
the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the [nineteenth] century, it embraced the 
broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’ . . . We have 
repeatedly and consistently rejected that narrow test [of use by the public] ever since.”). 
 108. Id. at 484.  The Court noted that its public use precedents had consistently deferred 
to legislative judgments. Id. at 483 (“For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence 
has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures 
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”). 
 109. Here, the Court used the language of Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388–89 
(1798). See infra notes 344, 425, 431 and accompanying text (discussing Calder in the 
context of the Mill Act cases).  Even though Kelo interpreted public use broadly, the naked 
transfer of property discussed in Calder would still be unconstitutional according to the 
majority. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. 
 110. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.  In support of its second statement, the Court explained that 
condemnation of land for railroads would be a common example of such a transfer. Id.  
Justice Kennedy clarified in his concurrence that the state would not be allowed to take 
private property under the pretext of public purpose. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
For an analysis of pretext claims post-Kelo, see Daniel S. Hafetz, Note, Ferreting Out 
Favoritism:  Bringing Pretext Claims After Kelo, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095 (2009). 
 111. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 
(Conn. 2004), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).  For this statement, the Court relied on the lower 
court’s findings that there was no evidence of illegitimate purpose in the plan. Id. 
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opposed to a piecemeal approach, would be respected.112  Further, even 
though the plan would not open up all the condemned land to public use, 
the Court cited Midkiff when rejecting the idea that the Takings Clause 
required literal use by the public.113  If the Public Use Clause were read so 
narrowly, the majority noted, takings would become not only “difficult to 
administer” but also “impractical given the diverse and always evolving 
needs of society.”114 
Like the cases before it, the Kelo majority did not discuss any historical 
interpretations of the Public Use Clause and instead cited prior public use 
case law to support its holding.115  In contrast, both dissents invoked 
originalist interpretations. 
2. Justice O’Connor’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice O’Connor, the author of the unanimous Midkiff opinion, dissented 
in Kelo, arguing the majority had effectively removed the Public Use 
Clause from the Fifth Amendment.116  Also beginning by invoking Justice 
Samuel Chase’s admonition in Calder v. Bull117 that a law transferring 
property from A to B could not be valid, Justice O’Connor viewed the 
takings at issue in Kelo as falling neatly into that category of purely private 
appropriations.118  She noted that, whereas Berman and Midkiff emphasized 
the importance of legislative determinations of public purpose, in her view 
the Court was equipped to determine that the taking here was purely 
private.119 
In contrast to the majority’s reliance on precedent, Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent largely focused on the perceived practical ramifications of allowing 
the taking at issue.  Justice O’Connor would have invalidated it because 
otherwise, she argued, all property would be threatened with 
condemnation.120  If “positive side effects [were] enough to render transfer 
from one private party to another constitutional,” then the Public Use 
Clause would not exclude any takings since “any lawful use of real private 
 
 112. Id. at 480–82. 
 113. Id. at 478–79 (citing Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)). But 
see Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 61 (discussing Justice Thomas’s disagreement with the Court’s 
rejection of the literal interpretation); supra note 91 (same). 
 114. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479. 
 115. Id. at 477–90. 
 116. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia 
and Thomas joined her dissent. 
 117. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); see also supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 118. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  After Berman and Midkiff, Justice 
O’Connor argued that there could still be unconstitutional transfers from A to B, unlike after 
the majority’s decision in Kelo, which she viewed as sanctioning purely private property 
transfers. Id. at 504.  For a discussion of Calder, see infra notes 344, 425, 431 and 
accompanying text. 
 119. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 499–500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. at 503 (“For who among us can say she already makes the most productive or 
attractive possible use of her property? . . .  Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing 
any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a 
factory.”). 
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property [could] be said to generate some incidental benefit to the 
public.”121 
In an effort to preserve the rule of Berman and Midkiff, however, she 
identified three categories of takings allowed under the Fifth Amendment:  
transfer of private property to public ownership, transfer of private property 
to private parties who make the property available for public use, and in 
some circumstances, takings that serve a public purpose, even if the 
property will not be used by the public.122  Since a literal interpretation of 
public use was sometimes “too constricting and impractical,” the third 
category would preserve Berman and Midkiff by allowing takings for 
private use in certain circumstances.123 
Finally, Justice O’Connor invoked a historical argument, echoing James 
Madison’s justifications for proposing the Takings Clause,124 by explaining 
that the public use requirement was originally intended to protect the 
security of property against majoritarian overreaching.125  Specifically, 
Justice O’Connor quoted James Madison:  “[T]hat alone is a just 
government . . . which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his 
own.”126  By ignoring this limitation, Justice O’Connor concluded, the Kelo 
majority was not faithful to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause, 
which would have prohibited a purely private taking.127 
3. Justice Thomas’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Thomas—in a dissent joined by no other member of the Court—
criticized Kelo’s holding, arguing the Public Use Clause historically 
provided a meaningful limit on the eminent domain power128 and accused 
the majority of replacing it with a “Diverse and Always Evolving Needs of 
Society Clause.”129  Using a strictly originalist argument, Justice Thomas 
presented structural, textual, and historical evidence to assert the 
 
 121. Id. at 501. 
 122. Id. at 497–98.  Justice O’Connor listed roads, hospitals, and military bases as 
satisfying the first category and railroads, public utilities, and sports stadiums as satisfying 
the second. Id. 
 123. Id.  In those cases, Justice O’Connor argued that because the takings directly 
benefitted the public by eliminating “harmful” uses, subsequent private use of the property 
was irrelevant. Id. at 500.  The majority opinion criticized Justice O’Connor’s distinction by 
insisting that there was nothing harmful about the use of property for a non-blighted 
department store in Berman or for mining or agriculture in the earlier cases. Id. at 486 n.16 
(majority opinion). 
 124. See infra notes 281–83 and accompanying text. 
 125. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Alexander Hamilton’s 
speech to the Philadelphia Convention on June 19, 1787 in which he asserted that “the 
security of Property” is “one great obj[ec]t of Gov[ernmen]t” (1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand, ed. 1911))). 
 126. Id. at 505 (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, 
reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266, 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 
1983)) [hereinafter 14 MADISON PAPERS]; see also infra notes 299–302 and accompanying 
text. 
 127. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. 
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Constitution only authorized a taking if the public could use the property, 
not if it realized a benefit from the taking.130   
Justice Thomas began by examining the definition of “use” in Samuel 
Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language, concluding the word 
meant “[t]he act of employing any thing to any purpose” at the time of the 
drafting of the Fifth Amendment.131  Accordingly, he argued, a transfer of 
property to a private individual without a right of public use strained the 
definition of “use,” even if the public benefited incidentally from the 
taking.132 
Structurally, Justice Thomas asserted that the Public Use Clause limited 
the takings power.133  Specifically, the words “for public use,” would be 
surplusage otherwise,134 especially since, in his view, the Takings Clause 
was not a grant of power to the government but rather a restriction on the 
use of its power.135  Approaching the structural argument from another 
angle, Justice Thomas also compared the words “for public use” to the other 
two appearances of “use” in the Constitution136 in Article I, Section 8,137 
and Article I, Section 10.138  In both instances, Justice Thomas asserted that 
the document utilized “use” in a narrow sense, not a broad one.139  He next 
contrasted these appearances of “use” to the term “general Welfare” 
appearing elsewhere in the Constitution,140 arguing that the founders would 
 
 130. See id. at 506–14.  In his dissent, Justice Thomas alternated between requiring the 
public’s actual use of the property and its legal right to use the property. Compare id. at 508 
(“[T]he public has a legal right to use . . . the property . . . .”), and id. at 521 (“[T]he public 
has a legal right to use the taken property . . . .”), with id. at 521 (“[T]he government may 
take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property.”) 
(emphasis added).  Actual use is a far more stringent requirement than legal use; property the 
public has a legal right to use can be put to purely private uses. See David L. Breau, Justice 
Thomas’ Kelo Dissent, or “History as a Grab Bag of Principles,” 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
373, 375 n.20 (2007).  This Note focuses on the actual use requirement. 
 131. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2194 (4th ed. 1773)).  Justice Thomas later 
conceded that Johnson’s Dictionary listed multiple definitions of “use,” including entries 
defining the word more broadly. See id. at 509; see also infra notes 169–71 and 
accompanying text (listing all nine definitions of “use” in Johnson’s Dictionary). 
 132. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 507. 
 134. Id. (“‘It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be 
without effect.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803))). 
 135. Id. at 511. 
 136. Id. at 509. 
 137. Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 grants Congress the power “[t]o raise and support 
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two 
Years.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (emphasis added). 
 138. “[T]he net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or 
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, 
cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 139. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 140. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common 
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and 
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”) 
(emphasis added); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . 
provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States.”) (emphasis added). 
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have used this broader term if public benefit were the only limitation on the 
takings power.141 
After his structural and textual analysis, Justice Thomas analyzed early 
common law142 and state eminent domain decisions143 to support the idea 
that the original meaning of public use was not synonymous with public 
benefit.  For Justice Thomas, the founding generation embraced the 
classically liberal tradition of protecting fundamental rights, including the 
right to property, from government appropriation.144  Relying on William 
Blackstone, Justice Thomas discussed English common law’s prohibition 
against taking private property solely for the purposes of public benefit.145  
Additionally, Justice Thomas, like the majority and Justice O’Connor, cited 
the Calder language to insist that the founding generation thought the 
government could not effect a purely private transfer.146 
Examining early state decisions regarding the constitutionality of the Mill 
Acts,147 Justice Thomas argued that the statutes largely comported with the 
theory that public use originally limited the takings power.148  He 
distinguished unfavorable case law149 by arguing that the presence of 
statutes requiring the flour mills to remain open to the public rendered the 
Clause satisfied.150  To explain the later extension of the Mill Acts to 
entirely private entities not open to the public, Justice Thomas contended 
 
 141. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 142. See infra Parts IV.A.3, IV.B.3. 
 143. See infra Part V. 
 144. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511–12 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  See infra Part IV.A.1 for a 
discussion of classical liberalism. 
 145. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“So great . . . is the regard of the law 
for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the 
general good of the whole community.” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*135)). But see infra text accompanying notes 256–59 (discussing Blackstone’s 
acknowledgement of the legislature’s power to use eminent domain without articulating a 
substantive limit). 
 146. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 510–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 386, 400 (1798)).  Contrary to the majority, Justice Thomas considered Calder’s 
proscription applicable to all purely private takings, regardless of whether any incidental 
public benefit accrued.  For the majority, the Public Use Clause would only proscribe private 
takings if no substantial public benefit occurred as a result. See supra note 109 and 
accompanying text. 
 147. The term “Mill Acts” refers in aggregate to several state and local statutes in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries allowing owners of water-powered mills to flood or 
condemn upstream lands if the owners paid the affected landowners just compensation. See 
infra Part V.A (explaining that early courts were inconsistent about their approaches to these 
statutes). 
 148. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 149. Unfavorable for Justice Thomas were Mill Act cases in which courts interpreted 
public use limitations broadly and upheld takings under the statutes. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 150. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see Boston & Roxbury 
Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467, 481 (1832) (holding that the Mill Act 
satisfied the Public Use Clause, even though the statute did not require the mill to allow 
public access); infra note 388 (explaining that only some states had statutes requiring mill 
owners to allow the public to use the facilities). 
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that those instances were too far removed temporally from the founding to 
be probative of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause.151 
Finally, Justice Thomas argued that the Court abandoned the original 
meaning of the Public Use Clause when it adopted a public benefit 
interpretation, deferring to legislative judgments of what satisfied this 
limitation.152  Justice Thomas insisted that it would be inappropriate for the 
Court to defer to a legislative determination of a quintessentially legal 
question.153  Additionally, he argued that the “public purpose” test began as 
dicta in Bradley,154 and the Court subsequently followed the test blindly 
without thorough analysis.155  Justice Thomas insisted that this public 
purpose test could not be applied in a principled manner, thus providing no 
coherent limiting principle to the takings power.156  Specifically, he took 
issue with the last century of Public Use jurisprudence as “wholly divorced 
from the text, history, and structure of our founding document.”157  To 
remedy the problem, Justice Thomas advocated overruling precedent and 
returning to his view of the original meaning of the Public Use Clause by 
requiring taken land to be actually used by the public.158 
III. THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC USE CLAUSE 
Textual analysis is an important tool used by originalists to analyze the 
Constitution.159  Many judges and scholars begin a search for original 
meaning by closely scrutinizing the Constitutional text in question, 
including researching historical word definitions and comparing a clause’s 
terms to other parts of the document.160  Accordingly, Part III begins by 
providing background on how to determine what words meant in 
 
 151. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 513 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  He explained that the 
constitutionality of these private takings were contested in courts, with some courts 
authorizing takings for public purposes and others adhering to a narrow view of public use. 
Id. at 513 & n.2 (comparing Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co., 11 Nev. 394, 409–10 (1876), 
a case that upheld the broad interpretation of public use as public benefit, with nine cases 
decided between 1832 and 1907 adhering to requiring actual use by the public). But see infra 
notes 382–84 and accompanying text (discussing an 1814 case interpreting the public use 
language broadly); infra notes 365–67 (noting that all Mill Act citations are susceptible to 
temporal criticism). 
 152. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514–15 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 517–18 (observing that courts would not defer to the legislature on other 
Constitutional questions such as whether a search of a home would be reasonable, when a 
prisoner could be shackled during sentencing, or if the Due Process Clause protects 
property). 
 154. See, e.g., id. at 515 (“[T]o bring into possible cultivation, these large masses of 
otherwise worthless lands, would seem to be a public purpose, and a matter of public interest 
. . . .” (quoting Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161–62 (1896))). 
 155. Id. at 516. 
 156. Id. at 520. 
 157. Id. at 523. 
 158. Id. (“The Court relies almost exclusively on this Court’s prior cases to derive today’s 
far-reaching, and, dangerous, result. . . .  When faced with a clash of constitutional principle 
and a line of unreasoned cases . . . we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of 
the Constitution’s original meaning.”). 
 159. See supra note 37. 
 160. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 38, at 553. 
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contemporary eighteenth century usage.161  It concludes by detailing the 
arguments advanced by scholars who prefer a broad interpretation of the 
Clause and those who favor a narrow one.162 
A. The Definition of “Use” in the Eighteenth Century 
Engaging in a close reading of the Public Use Clause requires 
contemporary dictionaries from the founding generation.  Samuel Johnson’s 
A Dictionary of the English Language was the most important source of 
such definitions from its first printing in 1755 until the latter part of the 
nineteenth century.163  Indeed, Americans at the time of the founding relied 
on Johnson’s work as a seminal authority on language.164  Thus, Johnson’s 
Dictionary is the standard source for ascertaining word definitions at the 
time of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights.165 
Before Johnson began his dictionary, he created a comprehensive plan 
detailing how he would accomplish the project, which included an 
explanation of how he would determine the order of definitions for a given 
word.166  The first definition would have a word’s “natural and primitive 
signification,” followed by its consequential, metaphorical, comparative, 
poetical, and peculiar meanings, in that order.167  To illustrate the 
definitions, Johnson also included quotations from writers who used or 
introduced particular words.168 
The third edition of Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English 
Language, published in 1766, provides nine definitions for the noun 
“use.”169  The first definition is, “The act of employing any thing to any 
purpose.”170  In order, the other definitions listed for the word “use” are:  
“Qualities that make a thing proper for any purpose,” “Need of; occasion on 
which a thing can be employed,” “Advantage received; power of receiving 
 
 161. See infra Part III.A. 
 162. See infra Part III.B–D. 
 163. HENRY HITCHINGS, DR JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY:  THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF THE 
BOOK THAT DEFINED THE WORLD 2 (2005).  Although there were other dictionaries at the 
time, “In the second half of the eighteenth century, and for most of the nineteenth, [the 
dictionary] enjoyed totemic status in both Britain and America.” Id.  Indeed, “for 150 years 
‘the dictionary’ meant Johnson’s Dictionary.” Id. 
 164. Id. at 230. 
 165. Id. 
 166. SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE PLAN OF A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1747), 
available at http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/Texts/plan.html. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.; see also HITCHINGS, supra note 163, at 95. 
 169. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1766). 
 170. Id.  This first definition has “Locke” written next to it. Id.  In his Kelo dissent, Justice 
Thomas cites the fourth edition of Johnson’s Dictionary, published in 1773, which has an 
identical first definition of “use.” See supra note 131 and accompanying text.  Justice 
Thomas also notes additional definitions of “use” in the 1773 dictionary that are identical to 
the 1766 version:  “‘[c]onvenience’ or ‘help’” and “‘[q]ualities that make a thing proper for 
any purpose.’” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 509 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
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advantage,” “Convenience; help,” “Usage; customary act,” “Practice; 
habit,” and “Custom; common occurrence.”171 
B. Broad Interpretations of the Text and Structure of the  Public Use 
Clause 
When examining text and structure, some scholarship concludes that the 
Public Use Clause should not be read literally.  Indeed, looking at 
Johnson’s definition of “use” shows that the word’s first, “natural” 
definition actually includes the idea of “purpose.”172  One commentator 
pointed out that using this definition to construe public use narrowly 
requires focusing only on the first half of the definition—the “act of 
employing”—thereby excluding the last half that specifically mentions 
“purpose.”173 
Further, textual interpretations often ignore the multiple definitions of 
“use” in the Dictionary.  Even though Johnson’s first definition supposedly 
contained the word’s most natural and significant meaning, the founding 
generation might have understood the phrase to be referring to one of the 
eight other definitions of the word,174 especially since no other definition of 
“use” would necessarily exclude a broad public purpose interpretation.175 
Structurally, the word “use” appears two other times in the 
Constitution.176  In response to those who compare its appearance in the 
Public Use Clause to these instances in the Constitution,177 Dean William 
Michael Treanor insists that interpreting Constitutional structure in this 
manner can be misleading.178  By restricting the comparison of “use” to its 
appearances in the Constitution, one forgoes an opportunity to examine the 
word’s usage in other eighteenth century sources.179  Another scholar 
agrees that the comparison could be misleading as there is no evidence 
supporting the notion that the drafters of the Constitution saw themselves as 
using terms of art.180  Rather, the Constitution was written in simple 
language that everyone could understand.181 
 
 171. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 169. 
 172. See supra notes 167, 170 and accompanying text. 
 173. Breau, supra note 130, at 376 (arguing that it is hard to defend a literal interpretation 
of public use with a definition that “itself defines ‘use’ in terms of ‘purpose’”). 
 174. Breau, supra note 130, at 376–77 & n.38 (“For a word such as ‘use’ that has nine 
definitions, order alone does not indicate how significant or common each definition was at 
that time.”). 
 175. See supra text accompanying note 171. 
 176. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 177. See, e.g., supra notes 136–39 and infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 178. Treanor, supra note 31, at 523–24. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Shaun A. Goho, Process-Oriented Review and the Original Understanding of the 
Public Use Requirement, 38 SW. U. L. REV. 37, 47 n.50 (2008). 
 181. Id. 
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C. Narrow Interpretations of the Text and Structure of the Public Use 
Clause 
Other scholarship concludes that the text and structure of the Public Use 
Clause require a narrow reading instead.  Such an interpretation, according 
to this school, conforms more closely to the historical, as well as modern, 
meaning of the term.182  In particular, Professor Eric Claeys cites Johnson’s 
primary definition of “use,” combined with Johnson’s definition of “public” 
as “[b]elonging to a state or nation; not private,”183 to assert that the Clause 
“requires the public to employ the asset in question, and do so for ends 
chosen by the public.”184  Through examining the definitions of both 
“public” and “use” together, instead of exclusively focusing on the word 
“use,” he argues that the combination of meanings necessarily excludes the 
idea of private use.185 
Structurally, by comparing the appearances of the word “use” in the 
Constitution, Professor Claeys insists that Article I, Section 8186 and Article 
I, Section 10187 both contemplate an idea of “use” that does not include the 
concept of “purpose.”188  Specifically, these provisions direct 
appropriations of money, and the text intends for the U.S. Army and the 
U.S. Treasury, respectively, to direct the employment of the funds, rather 
than having the funds spent on purposes only secondarily useful to the 
institutions.189  Thus, from a comparative structural perspective, he argues 
the Public Use Clause should be interpreted more narrowly in accordance 
with those other clauses in the Constitution.190 
D. Comparing the Broad and Narrow Interpretations 
When originalist scholars closely examine the text of the Public Use 
Clause to determine whether its original meaning contemplated the idea of 
public benefit, the primary eighteenth century definition actually defined 
“use” in terms of “purpose.”191  In contrast to Justice Scalia’s assertion that 
words frequently have an easily discernable meaning,192 identical 
dictionary definitions lead scholars to substantially different conclusions.193  
 
 182. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 896. 
 183. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 169. 
 184. Claeys, supra note 182, at 896.  Professor Claeys does admit, like scholars who 
argue for a broad interpretation, that the word “use” also had several other meanings 
according to Johnson’s Dictionary and other eighteenth century sources, including several 
definitions closer to the idea of purpose. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See supra note 137. 
 187. See supra note 138. 
 188. Claeys, supra note 182, at 897. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.; see also supra note 40 (explaining that if text is ambiguous, an interpretation that 
harmonizes it with the rest of the Constitution is preferred). 
 191. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text 
 193. Compare supra note 173 and accompanying text, with supra notes 184–85 and 
accompanying text. 
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Those advancing a broad interpretation argue that a strict limit cannot be 
found if “use” and “purpose” are essentially synonymous.194  On the other 
hand, those interpreting public use narrowly take an entirely different 
approach, combining the meanings of “use” and “public” to argue that, 
when read together, the resulting definition explicitly proscribes private 
uses.195 
Structural interpretations pose similar difficulties, especially as scholars 
do not even agree that a Constitutional comparison is an appropriate method 
of analysis.196  These textual and structural analyses of the Public Use 
Clause do not clarify what limitation, if any, the founding generation saw in 
the Clause.  When faced with inconsistent evidence from these sources, 
originalists next examine the historical record to ascertain what early 
Americans would have understood the Clause to mean at the time of its 
drafting and ratification. 
IV. THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC USE IN AMERICA 
Part IV provides the historical background on which originalist scholars 
and jurists rely.197  To shed light on the original meaning of public use, Part 
IV recounts the philosophies and ideologies important to the founding 
generation as well as early American attitudes towards property, including a 
discussion of the details of the drafting and ratification of the Takings 
Clause.198  For the originalist, examining this type of historical evidence 
reveals the context through which the Public Use Clause would have been 
understood in the late eighteenth century.199  Finally, Part IV closes by 
examining how modern scholars have interpreted the historical evidence to 
support either a broad or narrow interpretation of public use limitations.200 
A. Legal and Ideological Influences on the Founding Generation 
The values held by early Americans influence how scholars interpret the 
original public meaning of Constitutional text.201  Two dominant political 
philosophies of the late eighteenth century—classical liberalism and 
classical republicanism—espoused contradictory ways of interpreting the 
individual’s relationship to the state and the legislature’s ability to act on 
behalf of the citizens, key questions in evaluating what public use 
limitations could have meant to members of the founding generation. 
 
 194. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text. 
 197. Since the text of the Public Use Clause does not explicitly require actual use of 
condemned land, see supra Part III, originalist scholars also examine historical sources to 
ascertain the original meaning of the words to the founding generation. See Calabresi & 
Prakash, supra note 38, at 553; Rappaport, supra note 38, at 1494. 
 198. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 199. Rappaport, supra note 38, at 1493–94 (explaining originalist methodology). 
 200. See infra Part IV.C–E. 
 201. See, e.g., infra notes 342–44 and accompanying text (noting that scholars who 
interpret the Public Use Clause narrowly often cite John Locke as an inspiration to the 
founding generation). 
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Professor Margaret Jane Radin described the difference between the 
ideologies succinctly when she noted, “If we see the government as ‘them’ 
we adopt a ‘liberal’ theory of politics, and if we see the government as ‘us’ 
we adopt a ‘republican’ theory of politics.”202  For Professor Radin, 
viewing the government as “them” embodies the liberal ideal of protecting 
individual rights from exploitation, while viewing the government as “us” 
illustrates the republican ideal of promoting the common good over 
individual benefit.203  Professor Radin’s distinction also encapsulates the 
differences in how the philosophies interpreted the role of the legislature.  
For example, republicans conceived of the body as effectively representing 
all citizens204 while liberals were more skeptical, requiring the consent of 
the populace to validate legislative acts.205 
Recent historical scholarship has stressed that a single major 
philosophical paradigm did not dominate political thought at the time of the 
drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights.206  Indeed, both philosophies 
influenced the founding generation’s concept of property rights.207  The 
following two sections explore classical liberalism and republicanism in 
their most straightforward form, even though, in practice, members of the 
public were not purists in either ideology.  Finally, this section closes with a 
discussion of English common law’s prohibitions on the expropriation of 
private property—another significant influence on the founding generation. 
1. Classical Liberalism and the Importance of  Individual Rights 
Stated simply, classical liberalism promoted an individual’s self-interest 
over that of the common good.208  Liberals asserted that since individual 
rights existed pre-politically, a legitimate government could never abrogate 
them.209  Early American liberals viewed natural rights and the social 
contract as key concepts in political thought.210 
 
 202. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:  Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1693 (1988). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See infra notes 234–35 and accompanying text. 
 205. See infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 206. R.B. BERNSTEIN, THE FOUNDING FATHERS RECONSIDERED 34 (2009) (“In their 
attempts to interpret the American Enlightenment, modern historians often seek to assert the 
primacy of one or another body of thought or experience . . . .  It is all but impossible to 
make a convincing case for any single candidate . . . .”); DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, 
POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12 (1992) (“[A] thinker of the [founding generation] 
could even be attracted simultaneously to contradictory or even mutually exclusive 
concepts.”); Treanor, supra note 6, at 823 (“[T]here is now near consensus that both 
republican and liberal ideas powerfully influenced American politics during the 1780s and 
1790s.”). 
 207. Lopez, supra note 82, at 245 (“The influences of these competing theories, 
republicanism and liberalism, pervade the theoretical and jurisprudential history of eminent 
domain.”); see also Treanor, supra note 6, at 823; infra notes 281–83 and accompanying text 
(noting James Madison’s writings employed a mix of both philosophies). 
 208. Treanor, supra note 6, at 821. 
 209. Id.; see also infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 210. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 45 
(1992). 
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Greatly influencing the founding generation’s liberal ideology, John 
Locke’s theories specifically addressed these issues.211  For Locke, a “State 
of Nature” existed prior to government wherein all men were equal, 
possessed equal rights, and remained subject to natural law.212  The 
shortcomings of this State of Nature would lead to uncertainty and limited 
protection for individual rights and private property.213  In exchange for 
remedying these deficiencies, individuals would surrender some of their 
liberties to the civil government.214  Protection of property was key to 
understanding why individuals submitted to the state:  “The great and chief 
end therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting 
themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property.”215 
The development and enforcement of the law—shortcomings in the pre-
political state—would be the responsibility of the government.216  Although 
Locke saw the legislature as the most important component of the state,217 
he also noted legislative acts required the consent of citizens, either directly 
or through their representatives, to be valid.218  Early Americans drew on 
Locke’s social compact theory in the years following the Revolution to 
explain and to justify their new form of government.219 
As for property, liberals viewed it as an essential individual right.220  
Indeed, while the legislature could exercise eminent domain,221 liberal 
 
 211. Id. at 27 (“American writers cited Locke on natural rights and on the social and 
government contract . . . .”); Stephen A. Siegel, The Marshall Court and Republicanism, 67 
TEX. L. REV 903, 913 & n.76 (1989) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 
1815–35 (1988)) (explaining historians have used the phrase “John Locke et praeterea nihil” 
—“Through John Locke and no other teachers”—to describe the liberal philosophy 
associated with the American Revolution). 
 212. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690), reprinted in JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 4–15 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1967).  In this State of Nature, Locke proposed that individuals could acquire private 
property by intermixing their individual labor with communal property. Id. at § 26–27. 
 213. Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L. 
REV. 525, 545 (2007). 
 214. LOCKE, supra note 212, at § 123 (“[T]he enjoyment of the property he has in this 
state [of nature] is very unsafe, very insecure.  This makes him willing to quit a Condition, 
which however free, is full of fears and continual dangers . . . he seeks out, and is willing to 
joyn in Society with others . . . for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and 
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.”).  It is essential to note that Locke’s 
definition of property was not limited to a physicalist conception of land or material 
possessions; rather Locke used the term to describe the set of rights held in the state of 
nature as something “which Men have in their Persons as well as Goods.” Id. at § 173. 
 215. Id. at § 124. 
 216. Id. at § 131. 
 217. Id. at § 134 (describing the legislature as “the supream power of the Common-
wealth”). 
 218. Id. at § 138–40, 142; see also infra notes 221–23 and accompanying text. 
 219. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 283 
(1998) (“[O]nly such a Lockean contract, seemed to make sense of their rapidly developing 
idea of a constitution as a fundamental law designed by the people to be separate from and 
controlling of all the institutions of government.”). 
 220. See id. at 219; see also Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 40 (“[The Framers] felt that 
property rights and liberty were indissolubly linked.”). 
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thought placed restrictions on the power by requiring legislative 
prerogatives to serve legitimate ends.222  For example, an act that violated 
the principles of the social compact would be void.223  To justify these 
property expropriations—that is, instances when the state abrogated a pre-
political right—liberals turned to the compensation principle.  Accordingly, 
in a liberal view, government could only legitimately expropriate property 
by compensating the individual for his loss.224  Like the compensation 
principle, liberals might have also viewed public use as a similar constraint 
in order to preserve and protect individual rights.225 
2. Classical Republicanism and the Importance of the Common Good 
Classical republicanism looked to antiquity, particularly the Roman 
republic, for inspiration.226  Ultimately, the philosophy concluded that the 
ancient republics had been destroyed from within by “luxury” and “love of 
refinement,” rather than from outside invasions.227  This led early 
republicans to envision a society in which members would sacrifice 
personal concerns for the benefit of the common good.228  In contrast to 
liberalism’s emphasis on the individual, republicanism stressed the benefit 
of all citizens.229 
 
 221. See WOOD, supra note 219, at 404 (noting that property could be taken from an 
individual with his consent or that of his elected representative); see also infra notes 246, 
308 and accompanying text (explaining common law restrictions on the legislative exercise 
of eminent domain). 
 222. Gaba, supra note 213, at 563. 
 223. See WOOD, supra note 219, at 404–05; see also infra note 344 (explaining Justice 
Samuel Chase’s similar admonition in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)). 
 224. WOOD, supra note 219, at 405; GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 322 (1991) [hereinafter WOOD, RADICALISM]. 
 225. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 15 (1985); Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 54 (“Consistent with their high regard for 
private property as the bedrock of individual liberties, the Framers of the Bill of Rights 
restricted the exercise of eminent domain by imposing the ‘public use’ and ‘just 
compensation’ constraints in the Fifth Amendment.”); infra notes 342–44 and accompanying 
text (discussing scholarship asserting that liberals would have considered public use to be an 
explicit limitation on the takings power). 
 226. BAILYN, supra note 210, at 25; WOOD, supra note 219, at 49–51.  In particular, the 
founders focused specifically on Roman writers who discussed the empire’s corruption and 
subsequent decline. WOOD, supra note 219, at 51. 
 227. WOOD, supra note 219, at 52–53; see also BAILYN, supra note 210, at 25–26 
(“[American colonists] saw their own provincial virtues—rustic and old-fashioned, sturdy 
and effective—challenged by the corruption at the center of power, by the threat of tyranny, 
and by a constitution gone wrong.”). 
 228. WOOD, supra note 219, at 53. 
 229. See, e.g., id. at 53–54 (“The sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the 
whole formed the essence of republicanism and comprehended for Americans the idealistic 
goal of their Revolution. . . . in which the common good would be the only objective of 
government.”); Treanor, supra note 6, at 821 (noting that republican theory emphasized that 
individual rights are subject to the interests of the common good); Nathan Alexander Sales, 
Note, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment’s “Public Use” Requirement, 49 
DUKE L.J. 339, 350 (1999) (explaining that republicans believed the government’s primary 
object was to advance the “res publica,” or common good); William Michael Treanor, Note, 
The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 699 (1985) [hereinafter Treanor, Note] (arguing that the 
2010] RECONCILING ORIGINALISM 291 
Whether the achievement of this benefit required the subordination of 
individual interests to those of society230 or rather active participation in 
public affairs,231 republicans thought that the public had a single, easily 
ascertainable common good.232  Accordingly, “what was good for the 
whole community was ultimately good for all the parts.”233  Since 
individual interests were always subordinate to the public good, legislative 
acts could also be expected to reflect these overarching societal goals.234  
Republicans of the founding generation would likely have deferred to 
legislative determinations.235 
Regarding private property specifically, republican views reflected two 
different goals.236  On one hand, republicans saw property as potentially 
antithetical to the promotion of the public good, remaining skeptical of the 
pursuit of economic self-interest.237  On the other, republicans also thought 
of property—specifically land—as a prerequisite for participation in 
government, largely because of the independence of landowners from those 
without such economic security.238  Such ownership in land, they believed, 
enabled citizens to make objective political decisions.239 
Applying the ideas espoused by classical republicanism and liberalism to 
the text of the Takings Clause potentially shows what early Americans 
would have understood public use to mean.  For example, the Takings 
Clause reflects two important republican goals:  self-denial for the good of 
the society and deference to legislative determinations.240  In this vein, the 
Public Use Clause could simply reflect the republican goal of contributing 
to and promoting the common good.241 
 
republican ideology centered on a belief in the common good and the idea of society as “an 
organic whole”). 
 230. WOOD, supra note 219, at 53–54. 
 231. Siegel, supra note 211, at 916. 
 232. WOOD, supra note 219, at 57–58. 
 233. Id. at 58.  Professor Gordon Wood further noted that, “Ideally, republicanism 
obliterated the individual.” Id. at 61. 
 234. Lopez, supra note 82, at 244; Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 700–01 (“As the 
voice of the people, the legislature could be trusted to perceive the common good and to 
define the limits of individual rights.”). 
 235. Lopez, supra note 82, at 244. 
 236. Treanor, supra note 6, at 821. 
 237. Siegel, supra note 211, at 920; Treanor, supra note 6, at 821; see also supra text 
accompanying note 227. 
 238. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 224, at 234, 269; Siegel, supra note 211, at 920; 
Treanor, supra note 6, at 821; Sales, supra note 229, at 355-56; Treanor, Note, supra note 
229, at 699. 
 239. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 224, at 269 (“Landed property was the most 
important such guarantee of autonomy because it was the least transitory, the most 
permanent form, of property.  Such proprietary property was designed to protect its holders 
from external influence or corruption, to free them from the scramble of buying and selling, 
and to allow them to make impartial political judgments.”). 
 240. Lopez, supra note 82, at 247, 250 (“The public use clause reflects republicanism:  an 
individual property owner is required to sacrifice her property interest for the good of the 
public at the request of the government if the property taken is to be put to a ‘public use.’”). 
 241. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. 
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On the other hand, the Just Compensation Clause is more likely to have 
been justified on classically liberal grounds.242  Indeed, requiring 
compensation for expropriated property reflected this ideology by requiring 
the government to acknowledge an individual’s sacrifice.243  Accordingly, 
the Public Use Clause may also have been an additional method of 
protecting individual rights against state interference.244 
3. Influences from English Common Law 
In addition to liberal and republican philosophies, English common law’s 
limitations on eminent domain provide important background when seeking 
to understand the founding generation’s view on property expropriations.  
In his eighteenth-century treatise on the common law, William Blackstone 
directly addressed these limitations on the individual right of private 
property.245  Specifically, Blackstone noted that the legislature had the 
exclusive right to exercise the power of eminent domain:  “[When land is 
required] the legislature alone can . . . interpose, and compel the individual 
to acquiesce. . . .  All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to 
alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion 
of power . . . which nothing but the legislature can perform.”246 
While acknowledging the legislature possessed the power of eminent 
domain, Blackstone simultaneously echoed the protections of the Magna 
Carta for private property247 and classical liberal sentiment regarding the 
importance of individual rights248 when stating, “So great . . . is the regard 
of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation 
of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community.”249 
In England, while the Magna Carta generally prohibited the Crown from 
taking private property,250 important exceptions did exist in which the 
monarch could expropriate land.251  Technically speaking, though, the 
 
 242. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 243. Lopez, supra note 82, at 247–48. 
 244. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 245. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *134–36.  Blackstone defined property as “free 
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save 
only by the laws of the land.” Id. at *134. 
 246. Id. at *135 (emphasis added).  Blackstone also noted that eminent domain is a power 
“the legislature indulges with caution.” Id. 
 247. MAGNA CARTA, cl. 39 (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES:  
DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 
BILL OF RIGHTS 11, 17 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1991) [hereinafter SOURCES 
OF OUR LIBERTIES] (“No free man shall be . . . dispossessed . . . except by the legal judgment 
of his peers or by the law of the land.”). 
 248. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 249. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *135; see also supra note 145 and accompanying 
text (explaining that Justice Thomas also relies on this quote in his Kelo dissent).  To explain 
this statement, Blackstone offered an example of building a new road through private 
property, which would be beneficial to the public, but noted “the law permits no man . . . to 
do this without consent of the owner of the land.” 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *135. 
 250. See supra note 247; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *135. 
 251. For example, the King could use a subject’s property when it was necessary for the 
realm’s defense or if he could assert superior title. See Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” 
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Crown could not actually take title to seized property.252  As explained 
above, the power to divest an owner of title to property resided in 
Parliament alone.253  When Blackstone confirmed this principle,254 
however, he did not articulate any substantive limit on eminent domain, 
other than that it should be exercised cautiously.255 
Because Blackstone accepted the legislature’s power to take property,256 
interpreting his statement about the “great . . . regard of the law for private 
property”257 is difficult.  On one hand, Blackstone could have been 
describing the limited takings power held by the Crown, rather than the 
more expansive one held by Parliament.258  On the other, Blackstone’s 
statement could also be read to proscribe all takings for public benefit 
instead of public use.259  Like classical liberalism and republicanism, 
English common law does not definitively answer the question of what 
limitation public use provided early Americans. 
B. The Early American Experience 
While philosophy and the English experience undoubtedly influenced the 
founding generation, other uniquely American conditions also contributed 
to the founding generation’s views on property rights.  This section begins 
by examining state antecedents to the federal Takings Clause, followed by a 
detailed discussion of its drafting and ratification.  It closes by exploring the 
writings of Blackstone’s American counterpart, Chancellor James Kent. 
1. State Antecedents to the Takings Clause 
Not every state constitution contained a clause equivalent to the Public 
Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, though the experience in some 
colonies caused citizens to be particularly wary of property expropriations.  
Accordingly, some early state constitutions did include additional 
substantive protection for property rights. 
The Pennsylvania and Virginia Constitutions were the first early 
American constitutions to use the term “public use” in 1776.260  Later, the 
 
and the Original Understanding of the So-Called “Takings” Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 
1259 (2002); William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. 
REV. 553, 562–63 (1972). 
 252. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1259–60 (noting that, when necessary for defense, the 
subject still owned the land while the Crown used it, whereas the Crown already held title to 
the property in the other case). 
 253. See supra note 246 and accompanying text; see also Harrington, supra note 251, at 
1260, 1264 (arguing the power of eminent domain resides in the legislature because takings 
require consent of the owner, which must be achieved directly or through his legal 
representatives). 
 254. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at *135. 
 255. Id.; see also Goho, supra note 180, at 51. 
 256. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 258. See Breau, supra note 130, at 385. 
 259. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 260. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
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New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 paralleled Pennsylvania’s 
language.261  While the first “public use” language did appear 
constitutionally prior to Madison’s proposal for the Bill of Rights,262 the 
historical record lacks documentary evidence explaining whether these 
provisions actually originally limited the states’ power of eminent 
domain.263  Importantly, three state or territory constitutions also had 
provisions more explicitly linking the power of eminent domain and the 
concept of public use:  Vermont,264 Massachusetts,265 and the Northwest 
Territory.266 
Fear of legislative overreaching was likely an underlying reason for the 
potentially more restrictive public use language in the constitutions of 
Vermont, Massachusetts, and the Northwest Territory.267  The unique 
historical experiences in these territories shed light on the language.  
Because of competing claims to Vermont land by both New York and New 
Hampshire, Vermont citizens were especially interested in the protection of 
property rights.268  Since the New York legislature had actually tried to 
 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 3081, 3083 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS] (“[N]o part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him, or applied to 
public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives.”) (emphasis added); 
VA. CONST. of 1776, § 6, reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, 3812, 
3813  (“[A]ll men . . . cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses, without 
their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected . . . .”) (emphasis added); see 
also Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 591 (“The words ‘public use’ first appeared 
constitutionally in 1776 in Pennsylvania and Virginia.”). 
 261. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XII, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 2453, 2455 (“[N]o part of a man’s property shall be taken 
from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative 
body of the people.”) (emphasis added). 
 262. See infra note 281 and accompanying text (referencing a 1789 Madison speech 
proposing various amendments). 
 263. Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 592 (“[T]he . . . evidence is not sufficient to establish 
that the drafters consciously intended such limitation.”). 
 264. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. II, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 3737, 3740 (“That private property ought to be 
subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it; nevertheless, whenever any particular 
man’s property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in 
money.”) (emphasis added).  The Vermont Constitution of 1786 has identical language. VT. 
CONST. of 1786, ch. 1, art. II (1787), reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 260, at 3749, 3752.  The people of Vermont only ratified the later constitution. 
Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 592. 
 265. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 1888, 1891 (“[N]o part of the property of any individual 
can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to the public uses, without his own consent, 
or that of the representative body of the people. . . . [W]henever the public exigencies require 
that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a 
reasonable compensation therefor.”) (emphasis added). 
 266. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra 
note at 247, at 395 (“No man shall be deprived of his . . . property, but by the judgment of 
his peers, or the law of the land, and should the public exigencies make it necessary, for the 
common preservation, to take any person’s property, or to demand his particular services, 
full compensation shall be made for the same.”) (emphasis added). 
 267. See Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 702–04, 706–08. 
 268. Id. at 703–04. 
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deprive Vermont residents of their land, the Vermont Constitution 
manifested skepticism toward unchecked legislative power and contained 
provisions especially protective of individual rights, particularly 
property.269 
In Massachusetts, citizens were similarly disillusioned with legislatures 
because special interest groups dominated state politics.270  In particular, 
citizens feared the legislature would not provide adequate protection for 
property because of concern over the debtor-creditor laws and confiscation 
of loyalist property.271 
Although the public use language in the Vermont and Massachusetts 
Constitutions loosely parallels language in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause,272 the Northwest Ordinance used more restrictive language, 
allowing eminent domain only in cases where “public exigencies [made] it 
necessary, for the common preservation.”273  This provision was likely 
added because of Congressional fear that the territorial legislature would 
rescind land grants.274 
The presence of state constitutional public use provisions protecting 
property against legislative interference can support the argument that early 
Americans adopted a more liberal view of protecting individual rights from 
government abrogation through establishing requirements for takings.275  
Specifically, if public use originally provided a strict limitation on the 
exercise of eminent domain, an individual’s private property would face 
less risk of condemnation. 
Still, when examining these early constitutional provisions protecting 
property from legislative overreaching, one sees that property was heavily 
regulated both before and after the Revolution.276  While regulation is a 
 
 269. See id. at 702–03.  The property protections in Vermont were part of a broader 
ideological shift in the state that specifically emphasized increased protection for individual 
rights against government overreaching. Id. at 703–04. But see Harrington, supra note 251, 
at 1277 (arguing that following the Revolution, Americans had widespread faith in 
legislatures). 
 270. See Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 706. 
 271. Id. at 706 & n.65. 
 272. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation”), with VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 1, art. II (1787), reprinted in 
6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 3737 (“[W]henever any particular 
man’s property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in 
money.”), and MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 260, at 1888 (“[W]henever the public exigencies require that the 
property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a 
reasonable compensation therefor.”). 
 273. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra 
note at 247, at 395. 
 274. See Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 707. 
 275. See, e.g., infra notes 343–44 and accompanying text (noting scholarship advocating 
this theory). 
 276. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern 
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259–81 (1996) [hereinafter Hart, Colonial 
Land Use Law] (listing land use regulations, including affirmative use requirements, 
aesthetics and community planning, and regulations for fencing, mining, riparian land, and 
wetlands); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of 
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substantively different power than takings, longstanding, extensive land use 
regulation in the colonies counters the idea that Americans of the founding 
generation believed in robust protection of individual property rights.277  
Indeed, this evidence can support the argument that early Americans 
adopted a more republican view of public use, allowing takings (and land 
use regulation) simply because it benefited the populace at large. 
2. The Drafting and Ratification of the Takings Clause 
There is little evidence of why the Takings Clause was included in the 
Bill of Rights.  No state ratifying convention proposed the Clause.278  There 
are no records of debates in either House of Congress or any of the states 
regarding its meaning.279  In the most specific instance of an early 
commentator addressing the potential original meaning, St. George Tucker 
opined in 1803 that the Takings Clause was likely included in the Bill of 
Rights to protect against arbitrary military seizures, which early Americans 
experienced at the hands of the British during the Revolution.280 
The history of the Takings Clause’s drafting and ratification is brief.  
Madison explained in a 1789 speech that his proposed amendments served a 
twofold purpose, each embracing a distinct ideology:  first, the Bill of 
Rights would protect individuals by creating enforceable rules, and second, 
it would act as a public statement of national aspirations.281  By protecting 
individual rights through setting forth rules for an ideal society, the 
amendments fulfilled both classically liberal and republican goals.  From a 
liberal perspective, the Bill of Rights would define and protect the 
 
the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1116 (2000) [hereinafter Hart, Land Use Law 
in the Early Republic] (listing similar categories of land use regulations). 
 277. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1298; Matthew P. Harrington, Regulatory Takings 
and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2059 
(2004) [hereinafter Harrington, Regulatory Takings]; John F. Hart, The Maryland Mill Act, 
1669–1766:  Economic Policy and the Confiscatory Redistribution of Private Property, 39 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 23 (1995). 
 278. See Amendments Proposed by the States (June 8, 1789), reprinted in 4 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA:  LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH FOREIGN 
OFFICERS BILL [HR-116] 12–26 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) 
[hereinafter 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (listing amendments proposed by the conventions). 
 279. Treanor, supra note 6, at 791. 
 280. Id. at 791–92 (“[The Takings Clause] was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary 
and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by 
impressment, as was too frequently practised during the revolutionary war.” (quoting 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES:  WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 305–06 (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 
1996) (1803))).  St. George Tucker was the first legal scholar to propose an interpretation of 
the Clause. Id. at 791. 
 281. See Treanor, supra note 6, at 837; see also James Madison, Amendments to the 
Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 196, 204–05, 207 
(Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter 12 MADISON PAPERS]. 
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individual against the state.282  At the same time, it would inform the 
populace of American values.283 
Madison’s initial proposed language for the Takings Clause read:  “No 
person shall be . . . obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be 
necessary for public use, without a just compensation.”284  The select 
committee assigned to examine the amendments altered Madison’s 
language slightly to its current form.285  The House of Representatives 
approved the amendment as written on August 24, 1789.286  When the 
Senate considered the proposed amendment containing the Takings Clause 
on September 4, 1789, it altered the language of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause but agreed to the rest of the amendment without comment.287  After 
resolving the differences between the House and Senate proposals affecting 
other portions of the Bill of Rights, Congress sent the amendments to the 
states for ratification on September 24, 1789.288 
As the drafting and ratification history is sparse, the writings of James 
Madison, the draftsman of the Takings Clause, are particularly important 
sources when seeking to discover the original meaning of “public use.”289  
When Madison discussed amending the Constitution, he explained that his 
proposed amendments covered only topics Congress would consider 
 
 282. James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 281, at 207 (“[I]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves 
. . . the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every 
assumption of power in the legislative or executive . . . .”). 
 283. Id. at 204–05 (“[P]aper barriers . . . have a tendency to impress some degree of 
respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the 
whole community, it maybe one mean to controul the majority from those acts to which they 
might be otherwise inclined.”). But see BERNSTEIN, supra note 206, at 57 (“Madison . . . 
retained skepticism about the power of a written declaration of rights to protect liberty in the 
face of a determined majority . . . .”). 
 284. James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 281, at 201.  Madison originally intended for the amendments to be 
inserted into the text of the Constitution itself, not appended as a separate document. Id.  His 
proposed Takings Clause was numbered fourth and was to be inserted in Article I, Section 
Nine between Clauses Three and Four after what would become the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause, and the Due Process Clause, respectively. Id. 
 285. H.R. COMM. REP. ¶ 8 (July 28, 1789), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 278, at 29.  The committee also renumbered the Takings Clause to the eighth proposal. 
Id. 
 286. First Session (Aug. 24, 1789), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JOURNAL 165, 166–67 (Linda Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter 3 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY]. 
 287. First Session (Sept. 4, 1789), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  SENATE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 
153, 154 (Linda Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1972). 
 288. First Session (Sept. 24, 1789), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
286, at 227, 228–29.  The amendments were renumbered after ratification in 1791 to reflect 
the current order because the states approved only ten of the original twelve proposals. U.S. 
CONST. amend. V; AMAR, supra note 64, at 8. 
 289. See Treanor, supra note 6, at 791.  This section does not review Madison’s writings 
in an effort to uncover his subjective intent in including the Takings Clause among his 
proposals for the Bill of Rights.  Rather it explores his writings to illustrate what Madison 
and early Americans might have felt about substantive protection for private property. 
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uncontroversial.290  This statement, combined with the lack of debate in the 
House, Senate, or states on the inclusion of the Takings Clause, lends 
credence to the argument that the Takings Clause might simply have served 
as an uncontroversial statement of the status quo on eminent domain, which 
seemed to contemplate some, but not too much, protection for private 
property.291 
Along that vein, Madison’s Federalist No. 10 argued even before the 
Constitution’s ratification that a strong federal republic was the best means 
of controlling factions and competing interests.292  In particular, Madison 
pointed out that those with property and those without had distinctly 
different concerns.293  Government inevitably created winners and losers, 
and a federal system would most effectively counteract a group’s ability to 
seize and maintain control of the government, a task that would be easier to 
accomplish at a more localized level.294  Since the political process would 
provide adequate structural protection for property interests, Federalist No. 
10 suggested that Madison, as well as other early Americans, might not 
have seen additional substantive protections for property as necessary.295 
Nonetheless, examining other Madison writings shows that he thought 
physical property—particularly land and slaves—might need substantive 
protection from the political process.296  Indeed, the inevitable population 
increase could potentially make landowners a minority, subject to the 
whims of non-landowners who might pass redistributive legislation.297  In 
this way, some early Americans might also have thought that physical 
property interests needed additional protection beyond what the political 
process already provided.298 
Finally, Madison’s writings after the ratification of the Bill of Rights 
continued to draw a distinction between the types of property requiring 
additional protection.  In particular, his essay Property responded to 
Alexander Hamilton’s proposed economic programs.299  In the tract, 
Madison conceived of property as more than a mere physical object, 
describing it as including several intangibles such as opinions, safety, and 
 
 290. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 12 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 281, at 219 (“[The proposed amendments are] limited to points which 
are important in the eyes of many and can be objectionable in the eyes of none.”); Letter 
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra 
note 281, at 272 (“Inclosed is a copy of sundry amendments to the Constitution . . . .  Every 
thing of a controvertible nature that might endanger the concurrence of two-thirds of each 
House and three-fourths of the States was studiously avoided.”). 
 291. See infra note 315 and accompanying text. 
 292. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57–61 (James Madison) (Lawbook Exch. & Martino 
Publishing 2001). 
 293. Id. at 55. 
 294. Id. at 60–61. 
 295. Treanor, supra note 6, at 842–43. 
 296. Id. at 847. 
 297. Id. at 849. 
 298. Id. at 851; see also Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 708 (“[The Takings Clause] 
was to apply . . . only to physical takings.”). 
 299. Treanor, supra note 6, at 838. 
2010] RECONCILING ORIGINALISM 299 
free choice.300  Madison directly invoked the language of the Takings 
Clause to distinguish between physical and other types of takings,301 
criticizing the spirit of Hamilton’s economic program, a non-physical 
taking, as inconsistent with the goals of the Takings Clause.302  This 
statement demonstrates Madison, as well as other early Americans, might 
have contemplated a more robust role for the Takings Clause in protecting 
individuals. 
Examining the drafting and ratification history of the Takings Clause 
provides few answers as to its original meaning.  Further, ascertaining a 
cohesive Madisonian theory on property proves equally elusive.  Madison’s 
stated goals in proposing the Bill of Rights encapsulated two different 
philosophical ideals:  classical liberalism and classical republicanism.  
Further, Madison suggested in some contemporary writings that property 
did not need additional substantive protection and in others that physical 
property, especially land, just might.  In the years after the Bill of Rights, 
Madison’s Property envisioned an even more liberal view of the Takings 
Clause as protective, at least in spirit, of individual rights. 
3. American Common Law 
American eminent domain doctrine did not stray far from traditional 
English law.303  Like Blackstone’s treatise, Chancellor Kent’s 
Commentaries on American Law discussed early American views on 
private property.304  Initially published in four volumes between 1826 and 
1830,305 Kent’s Commentaries played an integral role in establishing 
American common law.306 
In describing private property, Kent echoed Blackstone and the English 
tradition when noting, “[N]o man [can] be deprived of his property without 
his consent . . . .”307  As for eminent domain, Kent emphasized that the 
power “gives to the legislature the control of private property for public 
uses, and for public uses only.”308 
Kent went on to explain that the legislature had the power to determine 
when “public uses require[d] the assumption of private property,”309 
explaining that a taking would be unconstitutional if it were “for a purpose 
 
 300. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 126, at 266. 
 301. Id. at 267–68 (“If there be a government then which prides itself in maintaining the 
inviolability of property; which provides that none shall be taken directly even for public use 
without indemnification to the owner, and yet directly violates the property which 
individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their persons, and their faculties . . . such a 
government is not a pattern for the United States.”). 
 302. Treanor, supra note 6, at 839. 
 303. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1270; see also supra Part IV.A.3. 
 304. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *317–54 (1873). 
 305. Carl F. Stychin, The Commentaries of Chancellor James Kent and the Development 
of an American Common Law, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440, 443 (1993). 
 306. Id. at 462. 
 307. 2 KENT, supra note 304, at *323. 
 308. Id. at *339 (emphasis added). 
 309. Id. at *340. 
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not of a public nature.”310  As Kent used both “public uses” and “purpose . . 
. of a public nature” when describing legislative limitations on eminent 
domain, it is unclear if he contemplated literal use by the public as an 
express limitation.  As examples of instances when a taking would be 
unconstitutional, he discussed taking property from A to give to B or under 
the pretext of public use, neither of which clarifies whether Kent thought 
property could legally be taken for public purposes.311 
Despite this language seeming to limit the takings power, Kent also noted 
that, “[T]here are many cases in which the rights of property must be made 
subservient to the public welfare.”312  He described a situation where roads 
could be cut through cultivated land without the owner’s consent because 
“the interest of the public is deemed paramount to that of any private 
individual.”313  Further, when describing a check on the legislative power 
of eminent domain, Kent cited the compensation principle, rather than 
public use limitations.314  Accordingly, Kent’s documentation of American 
common law in the years following the founding yields no definitive 
answers on whether early Americans considered public use to be a 
limitation on the power of eminent domain. 
C. Broad Interpretations of the History of Public Use 
Scholars advocating a broad interpretation of the original meaning of 
public use focus more on the early American experience than on legal and 
philosophical influences from Britain.  Through examining early state 
constitutions and the drafting and ratification history of the Takings Clause, 
they argue nothing in the record indicates that the original meaning required 
literal use.  Specifically, they agree that, although takings required some 
kind of public benefit, early Americans never insisted on actual possession 
or use of the appropriated property by members of the public.315 
The constitutions of Massachusetts, Vermont, and the Northwest 
Territory all contained public use language prior to the Fifth 
Amendment.316  To distinguish the early state antecedents, one 
commentator notes the language of the state provisions differs from the 
federal Takings Clause by seemingly requiring, in addition to the public 
use, a condition precedent to the exercise of the takings power.317  
Specifically, the Vermont constitution speaks of “necessity” while 
Massachusetts and the Northwest Territory require “public exigencies.”318  
 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at *338. 
 313. Id. at *339. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, “Public Use,” and the Conundrum of 
Original Intent, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 80 (1996). 
 316. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text. 
 317. Breau, supra note 130, at 381–82. 
 318. See supra notes 264–66. 
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The lack of similar language in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause might 
suggest that it is less restrictive than the state counterparts.319 
Along these lines, Professor Gordon Wood recounts how the new state 
governments aggressively asserted themselves post-Revolution, especially 
with respect to furthering economic growth.  For instance, he uses the 
example of the City of New York, explaining that after acquiring the power 
of eminent domain, it no longer had to concern itself with “whose property 
is benefited . . . or is not benefited.”320  Professor Wood concludes that in 
the years following independence, “The power of the state to take private 
property was now viewed as virtually unlimited—as long as the property 
was taken for exclusively public purposes.”321 
As for the Takings Clause itself, scholars interpreting it broadly argue 
that the complete lack of debate about it shows that early Americans were 
nonchalant about its limitations.  In particular, neither the colonial nor 
revolutionary experiences had created any pressing concerns among 
Americans regarding eminent domain.322  As one commentator noted, 
“[W]hile the British were scoundrels in a thousand ways, they never abused 
eminent domain.  They surely would have been accused of it if they 
had.”323 
In terms of seeking substantive Constitutional protection for property, 
these scholars point to evidence showing that early Americans were more 
worried about regulations affecting property value, than with actual 
physical appropriations.  For example, Professor Matthew Harrington 
asserts that federalists were mainly concerned with the potential to devalue 
property through either debtor relief legislation or printing of paper 
currency.324  On the other hand, anti-federalists wanted to limit the federal 
government’s taxation power.325  This absence of demand for protection 
from eminent domain showed a lack of concern on the part of early 
Americans that physical property rights would be abrogated.326 
Furthermore, these scholars argue that the term “public use” is used 
descriptively, not as a limiting principle, in the text of the Takings 
Clause.327  Given Madison’s eloquence, he could have phrased the Takings 
Clause explicitly to make public use an express limitation, if that were its 
original meaning.328  Indeed, after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, 
 
 319. Breau, supra note 130, at 382. 
 320. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 224, at 188 (quotation marks omitted). 
 321. Id.; see also Harrington, supra note 251, at 1252–53. 
 322. Harrington, Regulatory Takings, supra note 277, at 2079. 
 323. Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 594; see also Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of 
Eminent Domain:  History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 17 (1980) (“Eminent domain was one 
prerogative the British had not been charged with abusing in the New World.”). 
 324. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1288. 
 325. Id. at 1289. 
 326. Treanor, supra note 6, at 835; see also Harrington, Regulatory Takings, supra note 
277, at 2067–68 (noting that over two hundred amendments were proposed by state ratifying 
committees, yet none had to do with the expropriation or direct regulation of land). 
 327. Stoebuck, supra note 251, at 591. 
 328. 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES, 
at ii (1888) (“The language of the [Takings Clause] does not indicate [that public use was 
302 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
Madison commented in an essay that the Fifth Amendment limited the 
government from taking property “directly even for public use,”329 thereby 
implying that government had the power to take property for reasons 
beyond public use.330 
As the Takings Clause moved through the drafting and ratification 
process, no debate occurred in either the House or the Senate on its 
guarantees.331  The changes made to the text were purely stylistic, not 
substantive.332  Scholars assert this is especially compelling evidence 
because members of both Houses of Congress made alterations to many of 
Madison’s other proposals.333  Silence here indicates that the Takings 
Clause was likely a confirmation of the status quo, wherein actual use by 
the public did not limit the power of eminent domain.334  Further, they 
argue, the lack of debate also lends credence to the idea that the founding 
generation thought the Takings Clause, as written, adequately protected 
private property.335   
D. Narrow Interpretations of the History of Public Use 
Scholars who assert that the Public Use Clause originally limited the 
state’s power of eminent domain also focus on evidence from the historical 
record.  Through examining early state constitutions and founding era 
political philosophy, they insist that literal use is the only reading of the 
Public Use Clause that gives effect to all the words in the text.  To construe 
the words broadly would ignore not only Marbury v. Madison’s warning 
that all words of the Constitution should be considered336 but also the ideals 
of classical liberalism, a significant political philosophy at the time of the 
founding. 
In response to those who believe the Fifth Amendment Public Use Clause 
contains less restrictive limitations than early state constitutions, scholars 
advocating a narrow approach argue that constitutional public use language 
 
originally intended to operate as a limitation]. . . . If the intent had been to make the words, 
public use, a limitation, the natural form of expression would have been:  ‘Private property 
shall not be taken except for public use, nor without just compensation.’”). Cf. Hart, Land 
Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1101 (noting that Madison would have 
included land use regulation in the Takings Clause if he had intended the principle of just 
compensation to apply to regulatory takings). 
 329. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 126, at 267. 
 330. Goho, supra note 180, at 63 (noting that the word “even” suggests a difference 
between takings that are for a public use and those that are not). 
 331. See supra notes 286–88 and accompanying text. 
 332. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1286; Harrington, Regulatory Takings, supra note 
277, at 2078; William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633, 641 (2008) 
(arguing changes were likely intended to bring the Takings Clause in line with its precursors 
that almost uniformly used the word “take” or a variant); see also supra notes 284–85 and 
accompanying text (showing Madison’s initial proposal for the Takings Clause). 
 333. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1294. 
 334. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1133; Treanor, supra 
note 6, at 782; see also infra notes 414–16 and accompanying text. 
 335. Harrington, supra note 251, at 1287; Melton, Jr., supra note 315, at 80. 
 336. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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is always restrictive, rather than descriptive.337  These scholars insist the 
presence of such language cannot support an interpretation that effectively 
ignores the words of the text by allowing takings for public benefit.338  The 
public use language of state constitutions, they argue, must originally have 
functioned as a limit on the taking of property, otherwise the phrase would 
be surplusage.339 
In addition to the public use language, the Vermont, Massachusetts, and 
Northwest Territory constitutions all contained provisions suggesting that 
“necessity” or “public exigency” represented conditions precedent to the 
exercise of the takings power.340  Even if a state could point to these types 
of exigent circumstances necessitating a taking, these scholars assert that 
public use also imposed an additional substantive limit.341  This argument 
suggests that early Americans thought the takings power should be used 
sparingly and only in critical circumstances, rather than employed broadly 
to support social and economic goals. 
In support of a narrow interpretation, scholars also analyze the influence 
of political philosophy, particularly classical liberalism, on the founding 
generation.  Under classical liberal ideology, the state could never 
legitimately abrogate individual rights, including the right to property.342  
Generally, scholars who assert public use is an explicit and literal limitation 
on the takings power consider John Locke and liberal thinkers, who viewed 
government as an entity with limited powers, to be the primary inspiration 
for early Americans.343  These scholars argue that the founding generation 
agreed with the Lockean idea that government must abide by the same 
moral rules as those whom it governs.344 
 
 337. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 14, at 163 (“The prohibition on taking for public use is 
categorical, not squishy.”); Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain:  An 
Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1949) (explaining that “use by the public” was a 
limitation of natural law that did not even need to be explicitly stated). 
 338. Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California:  
A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of “Public Use”, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 569, 588 
n.95 (2003) (arguing that those who interpret the Public Use Clause broadly violate the 
fundamental notion that the Constitution must be read to give effect to all of its words). 
 339. Claeys, supra note 182, at 897. 
 340. See supra notes 317–18 and accompanying text. 
 341. Claeys, supra note 182, at 897; Sandefur, supra note 338, at 574–75.  Procedurally, 
Sandefur proposes that the legislature’s job was to evaluate the necessity of the taking, 
subject to judicial review of whether the taking was for public use. Sandefur, supra note 338, 
at 575. 
 342. Sandefur, supra note 16, at 3; Sandefur, supra note 338, at 583; see also Claeys, 
supra note 182, at 894 (noting Locke warned that eminent domain could not exist without 
the consent of the governed). 
 343. EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 15–16 (“The Lockean system was dominant at the time 
when the Constitution was adopted.”); see also Sandefur, supra note 338, at 579–80. 
 344. Sandefur, supra note 16, at 3.  Sandefur presents the debate between Justices Chase 
and James Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), as an example. See 
Sandefur, supra, at 9–12.  Justice Chase represented the Lockean perspective when he stated, 
“An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of 
the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.” Calder, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388.  Justice Chase offered the example of “a law that takes property from 
A. and gives it to B” as the quintessential example of such an invalid exercise of authority. 
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Finally, these scholars argue that the founders, particularly Madison, 
were especially concerned with factions, or the ability of a majority to 
make, enforce, and interpret the law.345  A taking can seem particularly 
arbitrary, especially if the appropriation singles out an individual 
landowner.  To protect minorities from potential majority abuse of the 
eminent domain power, a public use limitation was therefore necessary, 
scholars argue, to protect citizens against this kind of overreaching.346  If 
the public use limitation were construed broadly instead, it would eliminate 
an important check contained in the Constitution:  to protect the minority 
against the whims of the politically powerful.347 
E. Comparing the Broad and Narrow Interpretations 
Very different ideologies influenced early Americans at the time of the 
nation’s founding.  Classical liberalism and classical republicanism 
espoused opposite concepts of the ideal relationship between the individual 
and the state.348  By elucidating individual liberties, the Bill of Rights 
shows the influence of classical liberalism on the framers.349  At the same 
time, the Takings Clause in particular embodies classical republicanism’s 
focus on the common good by requiring individual property owners to 
sacrifice personal property for the benefit of society at large.350 
When scholars emphasize the founding generation’s liberal leanings, the 
outcome naturally leads to a narrow interpretation of public use to protect 
individual rights of private property.351  Nonetheless, it is impossible to 
characterize the founding generation as entirely liberal or entirely 
republican,352 and thus the tenants of neither philosophy provide 
authoritative evidence regarding the original meaning of eminent domain 
limitations. 
Early treatises on English and American common law also do not draw a 
coherent line between a literal interpretation of public use and a broader 
interpretation that includes public benefit.353  For example, Blackstone 
acknowledged the legislative ability to take property—without articulating 
a substantive limit—while simultaneously extolling that the law’s great 
regard for private property would not allow infringements, even for the 
 
Id.  Justice Iredell responded by questioning the validity of the argument that “a legislative 
act against natural justice must, in itself, be void.” Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring). 
 345. Sandefur, supra note 338, at 587; see also supra notes 292–94 and accompanying 
text. 
 346. Sandefur, supra note 338, at 587–88. 
 347. Id. at 588–89 & n.95. 
 348. Compare Part IV.A.1, with Part IV.A.2. 
 349. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra notes 343–44 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text 
 353. See supra notes 246–59, 307–14 and accompanying text. 
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common good.354  Likewise, Chancellor Kent described limitations on the 
power of eminent domain in terms of both use and purpose.355 
Several state constitutions drafted prior to the Bill of Rights included 
public use language similar to the federal Takings Clause.  Unlike the 
federal Takings Clause, however, the Vermont, Massachusetts, and the 
Northwest Territory constitutions also included language that required 
necessity or exigent circumstances as a prerequisite to use of the eminent 
domain power.356  While scholars disagree on whether this language makes 
it more or less certain that public use was an additional, stringent 
limitation,357 it is clear that several of the early state constitutions reflected 
local circumstances that were not present at a national level.358  At a 
national level, the British had not abused the power of eminent domain vis-
à-vis the colonies, whereas citizens in states like Vermont had actually been 
subject to attempts to appropriate land by the New York legislature.359  
Like political philosophy and common law practices at the founding, the 
early state constitutions do not provide a clear answer as to the original 
meaning of the federal Public Use Clause. 
Additionally, the sparse history of the Takings Clause’s drafting and 
ratification does not aid in the search for its original meaning.  Some 
interpret the lack of evidence as confirmation that the Takings Clause did 
not add any additional substantive limitations to the state’s ability to 
exercise the power of eminent domain.360  These scholars argue that public 
use was synonymous with public benefit in early America.361  In contrast, 
scholars who interpret the Clause narrowly insist that reading it this way 
blatantly disregards the text of the Amendment.362 
In the case of public use, the text, structure, and history of the Takings 
Clause provide no authoritative meaning on what kind of limitations it 
places on the power of eminent domain.  With these sources yielding 
inconsistent conclusions on original meaning, originalists look to see if 
early judicial interpretations present a coherent idea of how early 
Americans viewed public use limitations. 
V. EARLY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF PUBLIC USE 
Part V examines judicial interpretations of the Mill Acts, a group of 
statutes legalizing eminent domain by private actors for the purpose of 
 
 354. See supra notes 249, 253–55 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 309–10 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 317–19, 340–41 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 267–74 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 268–69, 322–23 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 331–35 and accompanying text. 
 361. See Melton, Jr., supra note 315, at 85 (“[T]he doctrine . . . is consistent with the 
original American concept, which appeared in colonial, revolutionary, and early national 
days, that while ‘public use’ was necessary, ‘public use’ actually meant public benefit—of 
almost any conceivable kind.”). 
 362. See supra notes 337–39 and accompanying text. 
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public economic benefit.363  These cases provide a close analogy to the 
question of public use in Kelo.364  Despite most decisions occurring several 
decades after the founding,365 scholars and jurists in search of the original 
meaning of the Public Use Clause frequently cite precedent from the Mill 
Act cases, even decisions from the late nineteenth century, to support either 
a broad366 or a narrow367 interpretation of public use.368  Accordingly, the 
temporal relevance of the decisions is a criticism applying equally to all 
scholars relying on Mill Act case law. 
Because the Supreme Court held in the early nineteenth century that the 
Takings Clause applied only to expropriations by the federal government, 
not the states, property protections remained subject to state law during that 
time.369  However, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution following the Civil War, the Court gradually began applying 
the protections in the Bill of Rights to the states, eventually incorporating 
the Takings Clause in 1897.370  Since the first adjudications of federal 
takings did not occur until 1875,371 state law and eminent domain practice 
at the time of the drafting and ratification of the Takings Clause are the 
relevant decisions to review when interpreting its original meaning.372 
A. The Mill Acts 
The Mill Acts collectively refer to a group of similar statutes, enacted in 
several colonies and states,373 that essentially transferred the power of 
 
 363. See infra Part V.A. 
 364. While courts in the nineteenth century were faced with public use challenges by a 
variety of regulated industries, railroads or utilities for example, the Mill Acts closely 
parallel the modern context as the takings there were necessary for private economic growth. 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:  1780–1860, at 34 (1977). 
 365. See infra Part V.A.1–2; see also Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 54 (“The Supreme Court 
had little occasion to address the ‘public use’ requirement until the late nineteenth century.”).  
The Mill Act decisions are in some cases quite far temporally removed from 1780s–1790s 
and traditionally would not be particularly probative of original meaning. See supra notes 
36–38 and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, these decisions provide scholars the 
opportunity to examine how courts historically approached the issue of public use when it 
intersected with economic benefit, without addressing common carrier regulations.  
Interpretations of public use—both broad and narrow—relating to other private entities 
subject to regulations, like railroads, are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 366. This section will refer to a broad interpretation of the Mill Acts as instances in which 
courts used a public benefit standard to uphold the constitutionality of the statute at issue. 
 367. This section will refer to a narrow interpretation of the Mill Acts as instances in 
which courts required actual use by the public to uphold the constitutionality of the statute at 
issue. 
 368. See infra Part V.B–D. 
 369. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
 370. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238–41 
(1897). 
 371. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1875). 
 372. Treanor, supra note 6, at 859–63 (arguing that early state law and practice is relevant 
for evaluating original understanding). But see infra note 448 and accompanying text 
(justifying a departure from the original meaning by examining instead the post-
incorporation time period). 
 373. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1885) (listing twenty-nine 
states, as of 1885, that had Mill Acts or had previously enacted such statutes).  Delaware, 
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eminent domain to private actors—generally riparian landowners—to 
facilitate the building of water-powered mills.374  The statutes typically 
either authorized the mill owner to condemn neighboring land, 
compensating the landowner for title to the property, or allowed the mill 
owner to pay damages to the landowner for flooding resulting from 
damming the river.375 
Benefit to the public from these takings by private actors accrued 
indirectly by enabling the development of local industry, instead of directly 
by allowing literal public use of the land.376  In the case of some flour mills, 
though, the public benefited more directly because locals sometimes had a 
right granted by statute to use the facility to grind their grain.377  In general, 
as this section details, courts in the early nineteenth century allowed the 
takings for reasons of providing economic benefit, while later courts 
required the public to make actual use of the taken land.378 
1. Decisions Upholding Takings Under the Mill Acts 
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, landowners faced with losing 
property as a result of condemnations under the Mill Acts began to 
challenge the statutes, resulting in some courts upholding the laws by 
articulating a broad concept of public use.379  In many ways, these opinions 
 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia 
enacted statutes authorizing such takings in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, prior to 
the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights. Id.  Delaware later repealed its 
condemnation provision in 1773. See John F. Hart, Property Rights, Costs, and Welfare:  
Delaware Water Mill Legislation, 1719–1859, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 455, 461 (1998) (arguing 
that the reason for the repeal seems to have been a desire to protect existing mills from 
crowding, rather than a rejection of the condemnation power).  Similarly, Maryland repealed 
its condemnation provisions in 1766. See Hart, supra note 277, at 21–22 (positing that the 
repeal did not reflect a commitment to preserve private property as a similar condemnation 
procedure for ironworks facilities, rather than flour mills, remained intact). 
 374. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1116.  These statutes 
took a variety of forms in each state, and the differences between them are beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
 375. Id. 
 376. See Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 276, at 1267; Hart, Land Use Law in 
the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1117 & n.134. 
 377. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1117 & n.134; see also 
1 LEWIS 1888, supra note 328, at 246 & n.3 (noting Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, 
and North Carolina statutes explicitly required the mills to grind the public’s flour); infra 
note 388 (listing states without public access statutory requirements). 
 378. Compare infra Part V.A.1 (discussing cases that interpreted public use broadly from 
1814–1885), with infra Part V.A.2 (discussing cases that interpreted public use narrowly 
from 1832–1903). 
 379. See, e.g., Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 546 (1866) (interpreting “public use” as 
“appropriat[ion] of private property by the state . . . for purposes of great advantage to the 
community”); Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467, 481 
(1832) (holding that the Mill Act related to public exigencies and thus satisfied the 
Massachusetts Public Use Clause, even though the public had no legal right to use the mill); 
Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444, 452 (1867) (noting that public use does not 
require unrestricted access to the entire community); Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 
1 N.J. Eq. 694, 729 (1832) (refusing to declare a statute authorizing condemnation by private 
manufacturing mills unconstitutional on public use grounds because “[t]he ever varying 
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can be seen as the forerunners to later Supreme Court jurisprudence 
interpreting the Public Use Clause to require only a valid public purpose, 
generally determined by the legislature.380 
By allowing takings for public benefit, courts focused on the underlying 
purpose of appropriating the land, rather than scrutinizing the actual 
intended use of the property.381  In Stowell v. Flagg,382 for example, an 
1814 court noted that since mills were of particular importance to early 
public development, lands damaged by the flooding necessary to harness 
water power satisfied the public use requirement.383  Notably, the court’s 
decision did not focus on how the flooded land would further private 
industry.384 
The Supreme Court addressed the Mill Acts near the end of the 
nineteenth century.385  The case concerned an action for damages under 
New Hampshire’s statute, where the individual landowner challenged the 
Act as an unconstitutional taking of his property.386  The Court upheld the 
statute’s constitutionality, noting that it had not deprived the plaintiff of his 
property without due process because it was a valid exercise of legislative 
judgment.387  In particular, the Court stated that the validity of eminent 
domain under the Mill Acts had long been upheld as satisfying the public 
use requirement since harnessing water power for manufacturing purposes 
benefited the public.388 
Finally, in a case outside of the traditional water-powered mill context, 
the Nevada Supreme Court upheld takings used to support the state’s 
burgeoning mining industry.389  In doing so, the Seawell court considered 
the necessity of eminent domain and whether the appropriation would 
 
condition of society is constantly presenting new objects of public importance and utility” so 
what constitutes public use may vary according to time and location). 
 380. See supra Part II.A. 
 381. Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 
B.U. L. REV. 615, 633 (1940). 
 382. 11 Mass. (11 Tyng) 364 (1814). 
 383. Id. at 366 n.a. 
 384. Id. at 366–68.  The court did, however, question the motives of the legislature in 
providing strong protection for private mill owners. Id. at 366 n.a.  It is unclear in the 
opinion if the Massachusetts statute allowed the public to use the mill, but it is likely that it 
did. See HORWITZ, supra note 364, at 49 (“[The Stowell court] was merely questioning the 
prudence of the legislative judgment, while never doubting that mills were public in terms of 
whom they served.”). 
 385. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885). 
 386. Id. at 10, 12.  The plaintiff based his takings claim on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, not the Fifth Amendment, presumably because 
the Fifth Amendment had yet to be incorporated and valid against the states. Id. at 12; see 
also supra note 370 and accompanying text (noting the Court did not incorporate the 
Takings Clause against the states until 1897). 
 387. Head, 113 U.S. at 26. 
 388. Id. at 19.  While the New Hampshire statute required the mill be open for public use, 
id. at 10 n.*, the Court noted that, “[T]he statutes of many states are not so limited.” Id. at 19 
(naming specifically Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky as well as many 
New England and western states for not explicitly requiring public use in Mill Act statutes). 
 389. Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 398–99 (1876). 
2010] RECONCILING ORIGINALISM 309 
contribute to the public benefit.390  The court defended using a broad 
interpretation of public use, arguing that a narrow requirement could lead to 
perverse results.391  Indeed, the Seawell court argued that the broad 
interpretation contained more limiting principles than a test focusing 
literally on public use.392 
The court closed its opinion by referencing the founding generation, 
declaring that courts would be making an assumption if they presumed the 
original meaning of public use required actual public use of the condemned 
land.393  In reaching this conclusion, the court surveyed case law to show 
that previous judicial decisions had also eschewed a literal interpretation of 
public use.394  The Seawell court’s statements about original meaning show 
that even courts temporally closer to the founding than the Kelo Court 
considered determining the original meaning of the Public Use Clause to be 
a speculative exercise. 
When courts faced with challenges to the Mill Acts interpreted the public 
use language broadly, they generally emphasized the benefit to the public 
from allowing the takings, rather than focusing on the involvement of 
private actors in the appropriations.  Instead of engaging in textual or 
historical analysis, these courts largely relied on precedent to hold that the 
public benefit from the exercise of eminent domain satisfied public use 
restrictions.395 
2. Decisions Striking Down Takings Under the Mill Acts 
When courts interpreted the Mill Acts narrowly, the opinions generally 
emphasized the intended use of the taken land, instead of focusing on the 
purpose of the taking.396  These narrow interpretations emerged after the 
broad interpretations397 and advocated reading public use literally to limit 
the takings power.398  In particular, an early interpretation of public use in 
1837 questioned whether a broad interpretation provided any limitation on 
takings at all:  “When we depart from the natural import of the term ‘public 
 
 390. Id. at 411.  Echoing later jurisprudence, the court referred to assemblage problems as 
a primary reason compelling the use of eminent domain. Id.; see also supra notes 78, 84 and 
accompanying text (discussing assemblage problems in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 
(1954)). 
 391. Seawell, 11 Nev. at 410–11 (“If public occupation and enjoyment . . . furnishes the 
only and true test for the right of eminent domain, then the legislature would certainly have 
the constitutional authority to condemn the lands of any private citizens for the purpose of 
building hotels and theaters. . . . [T]his view, if literally carried out to the utmost extent, 
would lead to very absurd results, if it did not entirely destroy the security of the private 
rights of individuals.”). 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. at 408 (“I think it would be an unwarranted assumption upon our part to declare 
that the framers of the constitution did not intend to give to the term ‘public use’ the 
meaning of public utility, benefit and advantage.”). 
 394. Id. at 400–08. 
 395. See supra notes 388, 394 and accompanying text. 
 396. Nichols, Jr., supra note 381, at 626–27. 
 397. See supra note 378 and accompanying text. 
 398. In contrast, cases advocating a broad interpretation questioned whether literal use 
provided such a limitation. See supra note 391 and accompanying text. 
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use,’ and substitute . . . public utility, public interest, common benefit, 
general advantage or convenience, or . . . public improvement, is there any 
limitation which can be set to the . . . appropriation of private property?”399 
Some courts simply invalidated the takings made pursuant to the Mill 
Acts, instead of finding the statutes unconstitutional.  For example, in 
Harding v. Goodlett,400 plaintiffs sought to condemn land for mills 
producing flour, lumber, and paper.401  The court held that building the 
flour mill was simply pretext for the use of the condemnation power 
because the other mills would be purely private operations.402  In a different 
example from Vermont, a mill owner petitioned the court to increase his 
ability to flood a neighbor’s property.403  The court held that the taking was 
not for public use because the statute did not require the mill owner to 
provide service to the public at his facility.404  Accordingly, the taking was 
a purely private transfer, not a condemnation for use by the public.405 
Courts also went beyond invalidating takings to hold some Mill Acts 
unconstitutional.406  For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan declared 
a statute encouraging the building of “water power manufactories” 
unconstitutional.407  The court noted that the statute “should require the use 
to be public in fact . . . it should contain provisions entitling the public to 
accommodations.”408  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared a 
statute authorizing condemnations for the benefit of “any public grist mill, 
saw mill or other public mill” unconstitutional.409  Specifically, the court 
noted the statute authorized the taking of private property for uses other 
than public ones.410  In particular, the court defined public use as 
“something more than a mere benefit to the public,” such as the right “to 
use or enjoy the property, not as a mere favor or by permission of the 
owner, but by right.”411 
 
 399. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 60–62 (N.Y. 1837) (Tracy, 
Sen., concurring).  In support of his opinion, Senator Tracy cited case law in addition to 
historical authorities, such as European civil law philosophers, Blackstone, and Kent. Id. at 
56–61, 75–76. 
 400. 11 Tenn. (3 Yer.) 40 (1832). 
 401. Id. at 41. 
 402. Id. at 53–54.  The court noted, however, that the taking would be valid for the flour 
mill. Id. at 52 (“The grist-mill is a public mill.”). 
 403. Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648, 649 (1871). 
 404. Id. at 652–53. 
 405. Id. at 653. 
 406. See, e.g., Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 333–34 (1859) (invalidating a statute 
authorizing condemnations because the statute covered all mills, not exclusively public flour 
mills); Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500, 505 (1871) (invalidating a statute on the grounds 
that it allowed private actors to exercise eminent domain and because mills were not an 
appropriate public use). 
 407. Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 334, 342 (1877). 
 408. Id. at 338. 
 409. Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 68 N.E. 522, 523–24 (Ill. 1903) (quoting the 
Illinois Mill Act statute). 
 410. Id. at 526.  The court noted, however, that the statute would be valid for flour mills. 
Id. 
 411. Id. at 524. 
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B. Broad Interpretations of the Mill Act Cases  
Scholars frequently rely on the Mill Act cases to show how early courts 
interpreted public use requirements, especially with respect to statutes that 
promoted economic growth via the takings power.  Scholarship advocating 
a broad interpretation of public use argues that courts did not narrow the 
concept until the mid-nineteenth century.412  At the turn of the century—the 
relevant time period, scholars claim, for an inquiry into original meaning—
statutes such as the Mill Acts were “common, rarely contested, and 
universally upheld.”413  While public use was necessary to the exercise of 
the power of eminent domain, public use and public benefit were 
synonymous at the time of the founding.414 
While twenty-nine states had Mill Act statutes in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, over half of the colonies also had these statutes prior 
to the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights.415  Such widespread 
approval of statutes granting private actors the power of eminent domain at 
the time of the founding lends credence to the argument that the early 
Americans entertained a broad definition of “public use” that included 
encouraging public economic benefit.416  A treatise even noted that, “[The 
Mill Acts] cannot be justified upon principle without virtually expunging 
the words public use from the constitution.”417 
C. Narrow Interpretations of the Mill Act Cases 
Scholars who believe that public use should be interpreted narrowly seek 
to distinguish the Mill Act cases supporting the broad view.  They 
acknowledge that in many cases, early courts did uphold takings made 
 
 412. Goho, supra note 180, at 55 & n.99 (noting that the use by the public requirement 
originated in Senator Tracy’s concurring opinion in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. 
Co., 18 Wend. 9, 60–61 (N.Y. 1837) (Tracy, Sen., concurring)); Harrington, supra note 251, 
at 1252 (“[T]he so-called ‘public use’ requirement is really a rather late innovation in the law 
. . . mainly found in nineteenth and twentieth century American cases.”); Nichols, Jr., supra 
note 381, at 617 (identifying the 1840s and 1850s as the time period in which courts began to 
use a more narrow interpretation). 
 413. Goho, supra note 180, at 55. 
 414. Melton, Jr., supra note 315, at 85. 
 415. See supra note 373 (listing seven out of the thirteen colonies with Mill Acts prior to 
the founding).  Delaware and Maryland had repealed their respective Mill Acts by this date, 
although likely for reasons not associated with concerns about eminent domain and private 
property. See supra note 373. 
 416. See HORWITZ, supra note 364, at 47 (“The various acts to encourage the construction 
of mills offer some of the earliest illustrations of American willingness to sacrifice the 
sanctity of private property in the interest of promoting economic development.”); Melton, 
Jr., supra note 315, at 82–83 (noting that even though the Mill Acts explicitly took property 
from A to give to B, the Acts continued to be upheld for decades following the founding); 
Nichols, Jr., supra note 381, at 617 (“Public benefit . . . was long generally regarded as 
sufficient to establish public use.”); see also Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 55 (“[I]n the late 
nineteenth century both state and federal courts gradually adopted a broader reading of 
governmental authority to acquire private property.  The constitutional norm of ‘public use’ 
was increasingly equated with the more expansive concept of ‘public benefit’ or ‘interest.’”). 
 417. 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 
559–60 (3d ed. 1909). 
312 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
pursuant to the Mill Acts.  When this happened, they insist, statutes always 
required the mills to serve the public.418  In this sense, mills were akin to 
public utilities or common carriers, entities that could legitimately exercise 
the power of eminent domain for public use.419  Similarly, some suggest in 
the alternative that the statutes were simply a carry-over from the colonial 
period,420 and courts upheld them based on precedent, even though a strict 
public use test would have required invalidation.421 
Approaching the cases from another perspective, Professor Richard A. 
Epstein argues that takings upheld under the Mill Acts, or in turn of the 
century Supreme Court jurisprudence,422 are substantively different from a 
case like Kelo.  In those instances, the land taken for upstream flooding, 
irrigation, or mining differed substantially from a residential property 
possessing immeasurable personal value for the owner.423  Specifically, 
Professor Epstein views the earlier cases as instances in which “the private 
holdout risk was enormous, but the loss of subjective value to the 
landowner was negligible,” in contrast to the far more personal losses in 
Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo.424 
Proponents of a narrow interpretation also criticize scholars who ignore 
two early decisions, Calder v. Bull425 and Vanhorne’s Lessee v. 
Dorrance,426 both stating in dicta that property cannot be taken for private 
uses.427  Courts decided both Calder and Vanhorne’s Lessee within a 
decade of ratification of the Takings Clause, and the timing suggests that 
they are substantially more probative of original meaning than the Mill Act 
precedent.428  In Vanhorne’s Lessee, Justice William Patterson declared 
 
 418. EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 172 & n.24; Sandefur, supra note 16, at 15; Sandefur, 
supra note 338, at 600; cf. Claeys, supra note 182, at 921 (discussing the court’s holding in 
Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877), that a statute was unconstitutional because it did not 
require use by the public).  Many of the first Mill Acts required that the mills serve the local 
communities. See supra note 377 (listing states that required mills to remain open to the 
public). 
 419. Sandefur, supra note 16, at 16. 
 420. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 412–13 (explaining that a broad 
interpretation prevailed at the turn of the eighteenth century). 
 421. See EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 172–74; Note, supra note 337, at 604–05; see also 
Sandefur, supra note 338, at 600–01 (noting several states repealed the statutes for violating 
the public use limitation). 
 422. See supra notes 65–75 and accompanying text (examining cases where the Supreme 
Court upheld takings for the purposes of furthering irrigation and mining). 
 423. Richard A. Epstein, Kelo:  An American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 355, 360 (2005); 
Epstein, supra note 14, at 166. 
 424. Epstein, supra note 14, at 166. 
 425. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).  In Calder, the Court decided if a Connecticut law 
granting a new hearing in a will dispute was an ex post facto law forbidden by the 
Constitution. Id. at 386–87.  Justice Chase rejected the idea that there were no limitations on 
the power of the legislature, citing naked transfers of property as an inherent restriction. Id. 
at 386–91; see also supra note 344 (quoting the exchange between Justices Chase and 
Iredell). 
 426. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).  In a circuit court decision, Justice William Patterson 
examined a title dispute over lands in Pennsylvania. Id. at 304–06.  In the course of the 
decision, he discussed the ability of the legislature to expropriate property. Id. at 310–12. 
 427. Sandefur, supra note 338, at 589 n.98. 
 428. See id. 
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that, “The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social 
compact,”429 adding that, “Where is the security, where the inviolability of 
property, if the legislature, by a private act, affecting particular persons 
only, can take land from one citizen . . . and vest it in another?”430  In 
Calder, Justice Chase echoed similar sentiments when he declared that a 
law taking property from A to give to B would be invalid.431 
D. Comparing the Broad and Narrow Interpretations 
Judicial interpretations of the Mill Acts show there was little consistency 
to how courts interpreted public use limitations throughout the nineteenth 
century.  Whether the words were viewed narrowly or broadly depended 
largely on time, and frequently also on location and circumstance.  Since 
state courts employed an ad hoc approach, cases supporting a narrow 
definition and ones applying a broader conception can both easily be cited 
in support of a particular theory of the original meaning of the Public Use 
Clause.432 
These broad and narrow interpretations of the Mill Acts illustrate why 
ascertaining the original meaning of the Public Use Clause is difficult.  In 
particular, when interpreting the words “public use,” courts frequently cited 
precedent from earlier decisions instead of engaging in a historical inquiry 
on the original meaning of the phrase.433  While it is certain that early 
decisions regarding the validity of takings under the statutes interpreted 
public use broadly,434 it is also true that these cases generally dealt with 
entities required by statute to serve the public.435  It is equally true that the 
decisions interpreting public use strictly did not appear until later in the 
nineteenth century,436 and proponents of a broad interpretation insist that 
this is not the appropriate time period in which to inquire about original 
 
 429. Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 310. 
 430. Id. at 312.  Justice Patterson also noted that the legislature could take property from 
A and give to B upon payment of compensation and determination of necessity. Id. at 312.  
Nonetheless, Justice Patterson used the words “public purposes,” “good of the community,” 
“public exigencies,” and “necessity of a state” in the opinion, suggesting that they were 
synonymous with “public use.” Id. at 310–11. 
 431. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388; see also supra note 344.  In Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, did not consider the 
taking at issue to be equivalent to the type of “purely private taking” proscribed by Calder. 
Id. at 477–78 (quoting Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)). 
 432. See, e.g., Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 400–01 (1876) 
(“The authorities are so diverse and conflicting, that no matter which road the court may take 
it will be sustained, and opposed, by about an equal number of the decided cases.”); Lopez, 
supra note 82, at 261 (“[T]he result in any given case was, to say the least, unpredictable.”); 
Note, supra note 337, at 605–06. 
 433. See supra notes 388, 394 and accompanying text. But see Harding v. Goodlett, 11 
Tenn. (9 Yer.) 41, 52 (1832) (citing Blackstone for the proposition that eminent domain 
should be exercised with great caution). 
 434. See supra note 378. 
 435. See supra notes 418–19 and accompanying text. But see supra note 388 (listing 
states without statutory public access requirements). 
 436. See supra note 378. 
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meaning.437  What remains undisputed by scholars and courts is that the 
cases evaluating the Mill Acts are inconsistent at best, and precedent 
supporting either a broad or narrow interpretation can easily be found.438  
Because of these inconsistencies, the Mill Act cases do not provide a 
coherent understanding of the original meaning of public use. 
Comparing and contrasting the historical record as a whole shows that 
scholarship on both sides of the public use debate cannot satisfactorily 
account for all of the evidence on original meaning.  Those who advocate 
for a broad interpretation have very persuasive arguments based on the 
many definitions of “use,” the influence of classical republicanism, the lack 
of changes during the ratification process, and early Mill Act precedent.  On 
the other hand, those who advocate for a narrow interpretation have 
persuasive arguments based on the influence of classical liberalism, 
interpreting the Clause to give effect to all of its words, and cases preceding 
the Mill Acts.  Nonetheless, neither the broad nor the narrow interpretation 
can satisfactorily explain the comprehensive history of the Clause. 
VI. RECONCILING ORIGINALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC USE 
 CLAUSE 
This Note has shown that the historical record regarding takings is 
discrete, yet scholars present drastically different views of the original 
meaning of the Public Use Clause.439  The history reviewed by this Note 
does not get an originalist any closer to explaining whether Justice 
Thomas’s dissent portrays an accurate picture of early American attitudes 
regarding public use.  Comparing physical takings and regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, though, provides an interesting contrast.440  Finding that 
regulatory takings also eschewed originalism, this Note closes by proposing 
that originalism is not an ideal method of interpretation when there is no 
constraining historical guidance.441 
A. A Foray Into Regulatory Takings442 
While this Note does not purport to examine regulatory takings 
jurisprudence in detail, comparing takings law as a whole reveals 
 
 437. See supra notes 412–16 and accompanying text. But see supra note 365 and 
accompanying text (explaining that all Mill Act cases are temporally distant from the 
founding, a criticism applying equally to scholarly interpretations both broad and narrow). 
 438. See supra note 432 and accompanying text. 
 439. See supra Parts III–V. 
 440. See infra Part VI.A. 
 441. See infra Part VI.B. 
 442. The doctrine of regulatory takings refers to instances when regulations (e.g., zoning) 
affect property value, as opposed to losses suffered as a result of direct physical 
appropriations. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN 
PROPERTY LAW 678 (6th ed. 2007).  The main question in this context is whether a regulation 
of land use constitutes a taking, as opposed to whether the taking is constitutional. Id.  In 
regulatory takings cases, courts must decide whether property owners should be 
compensated for the difference in property value as a result of the regulation or whether 
compensation should be reserved for physical takings exclusively. Id. 
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inconsistencies in the use of original meaning as a method of Constitutional 
analysis.  Before Kelo, Supreme Court public use jurisprudence squarely 
rejected originalism, favoring instead reliance on precedent.443  In Kelo, the 
majority opinion continued the trend of eschewing an originalist 
approach,444 while Justice Thomas’s dissent advocated overruling precedent 
to return to original meaning, claiming that the Court’s public use 
jurisprudence was “wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of 
our founding document.”445 
A substantial number of scholars agree that the application of original 
meaning to regulatory takings cases is inverted.  This view is based on the 
same history discussed in Part IV, that the Clause originally only 
contemplated compensation for physical expropriations, never for 
regulatory takings.446  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,447 even 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, admitted 
that “[in the past] it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached 
only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property.”448  Indeed, the doctrine of 
compensation for regulatory takings is based on the precedent set in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,449 not on the original meaning of the 
Takings Clause. 
 
 443. See supra note 388 and accompanying text (noting the Court in Head v. Amoskeag 
Manufacturing Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885), stated the validity of eminent domain under the Mill 
Acts had long been upheld as satisfying the public use requirement for benefitting the 
public); see also Part II.A (explaining that the cases beginning with Fallbrook Irrigation 
District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), and ending with Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), did not engage in any textual, structural, or historical analysis 
when holding that public benefit satisfied the Public Use Clause). 
 444. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 445. See supra text accompanying note 157. 
 446. See Gaba, supra note 213, at 575; Harrington, Regulatory Takings, supra note 277, 
at 2055; Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 276, at 1101; Treanor, supra 
note 6, at 782; Treanor, Note, supra note 229, at 711. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 225, at 
102. 
 447. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see Ely Jr., supra note 15, at 43–44 (“In short, the famous 
1922 decision of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, in which the Court endorsed the emerging 
concept of a regulatory taking, was hardly an innovation.  Rather, it reflected the desire of 
the Framers for robust protection of the rights of property owners . . . .”). 
 448. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 
(1871)).  Justice Scalia later wrote that not compensating regulatory takings that eliminated 
all property value “[was] inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings 
Clause.” Id. at 1028.  Nonetheless, he admitted that “[t]he practices of the States prior to 
incorporation . . . included outright physical appropriation of land without compensation.” 
Id. at 1028 n.15 (citation omitted).  While Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Takings 
Clause originally applied only to physical deprivations of property, he argued that the post-
incorporation time period was the relevant inquiry to justify Lucas’s holding. Id. at 1028 & 
n.15. But see supra note 372 and accompanying text (explaining why early state cases on 
public use are the relevant judicial decisions for an inquiry into the original meaning of the 
Takings Clause). 
 449. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406–07 (1994) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice Holmes charted a significant new course, however, when 
he opined that a state law making it ‘commercially impracticable to mine certain coal’ had 
‘very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.’” 
(quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414)); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014–15 (“Justice Holmes recognized 
in Mahon, however, that if the protection against physical appropriations of private property 
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Opining on physical appropriations and regulatory takings requires 
analysis of the same Constitutional clause:  “[N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”450  Advocating an 
originalist approach for physical takings451 but a non-originalist approach to 
regulatory ones452 seems, at a minimum, contradictory.  In contrast to 
Justice Scalia’s observation that opened this Note, Justice Thomas accepts 
judicial interpretations “wholly divorced from the text, history, and 
structure of our founding document”453 in some instances but not in others. 
Limiting the social and moral judgments of jurists is an important reason 
for employing originalist methods.454  The inconsistent application of 
originalism to the Takings Clause, however, questions this justification.  
Comparing decision making in physical and regulatory takings cases shows 
original meaning may also function to disguise personal judgments.  For 
example, resorting to originalism to protect property owners from 
expropriations but ignoring original meaning to ensure compensation for 
regulations affecting value seems more consistent with a political 
philosophy than a judicial one.  As with the unsatisfactory historical 
analysis of public use, this inconsistency in constitutional adjudication of 
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause also lends credence to this Note’s 
contention that originalism is not an appropriate method of interpretation 
for the Public Use Clause. 
B. Originalism Cannot Provide a Meaningful Limitation in  Public Use 
Cases 
Proponents of originalism believe the interpretive method not only links 
judicial interpretation to the original meaning of the text but also constrains 
the judiciary’s ability to insert personal judgments into decision making.455  
Using the Public Use Clause as a case study, this Note has shown that both 
of those justifications for originalism fail in this particular context. 
 
was to be meaningfully enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of interests 
included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by constitutional limits. . . 
.  These considerations gave birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim that, ‘while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.’” (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414–15)); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he holding 
in [Mahon] today discounted by the Court has for 65 years been the foundation of our 
‘regulatory takings’ jurisprudence.”); Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory 
Takings’ Jurisprudence”:  The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 616–17 (1996). 
 450. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 451. That is, an analysis of the language “for public use.” 
 452. That is, an analysis of the language “taken.” 
 453. See supra text accompanying note 157. 
 454. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 455. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 206, at 145 (“[T]he certainty of history’s command is the 
most reliable restraint.”); supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.  It is important to 
clarify that this Note does not argue that originalism is not a valid method of Constitutional 
interpretation in general.  Rather, it explains, specifically in the context of the Public Use 
Clause, that when the doctrine fails to achieve its goals, it is not an appropriate method of 
interpretation. 
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For example, no scholarship on the original meaning of public use has 
adequately accounted for all the contradictory elements of the historical 
record.456  In light of this incoherence, originalism fails to connect modern 
judicial interpretation to “what the American People meant and did when 
We ratified and amended the document.”457  This Note has explained that 
particularly in the area of property expropriations, the historical record does 
not indicate whether the founding generation had a concrete conception of 
the extent to which the rights should be protected.  As a result, the 
scholarship presents the best evidence supporting arguments on both sides 
of the debate, and although there are individually persuasive arguments for 
both narrow and broad interpretations, no piece satisfactorily incorporates 
all of the historical record. 
Furthermore, the Court has consistently eschewed original meaning when 
interpreting the Public Use Clause for physical deprivations of property,458 
as well as the Takings Clause for regulations affecting the value of 
property.459  In rendering a decision on regulatory takings, Justices Scalia 
and Thomas acknowledged the Takings Clause did not originally apply to 
such regulations.460  Inviting the Court to return to originalism in one aspect 
of eminent domain law but not in all aspects seems more tailored to 
preserving a consistent political philosophy on takings than a judicial 
philosophy on the advantages of originalist interpretation.461 
Only three physical appropriations cases have reached the Supreme Court 
since the 1950s, and given Kelo’s ruling and deference to legislative 
determinations,462 it seems unlikely that one will reach the Court again.  
Still, in response to the claims in Justice Thomas’s Kelo dissent that the 
original meaning of the Public Use Clause required use by the public, this 
Note proposes two answers. 
First, as discussed above, the traditional search for original meaning has 
failed in this particular context.  Even though Justice Scalia recognizes 
originalists sometimes reach different conclusions regarding original 
meaning,463 the accounts presented by scholars vary widely and do not 
provide a satisfactory explanation of the entire history of the Public Use 
Clause.  Second, the piecemeal application of originalism to takings cases 
shows that the methodology might not be fulfilling its goal of excising 
personal judgments from decision making. 
 
 456. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 457. See supra note 37; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 206, at 109 (explaining that, even 
in the first ten years after the Constitution’s ratification, “the workings of the new 
Constitution raised problems that its framers and ratifiers did not anticipate . . . problems that 
cast new and disturbing light on some of their most cherished ideas . . . .”). 
 458. See supra Part II.A. 
 459. See supra Part VI.A. 
 460. See supra note 448 and accompanying text. 
 461. BERNSTEIN, supra note 206, at 147 (“[Originalism] thus decays from being a 
restraint on judicial discretion to becoming a cloak for judicial discretion; judges mold 
history as they choose to support their interpretation and then impose the onus for an 
unpopular decision on the dead past.”). 
 462. See supra note 103 (explaining the state legislative response to Kelo’s ruling). 
 463. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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In an effort to reconcile originalism with the history of the Public Use 
Clause, this Note suggests that the Court’s current approach aligns with a 
broader idea of original meaning than the one associated with a detailed 
textual, structural, and historical analysis.464  This Note shows that while 
the public use case law relies on precedent that does not employ a 
traditional originalist analysis, still “the existing constitutional order is” not 
“at variance with what we know of the original understanding.”465 
Specifically, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution primarily 
addresses issues of legal procedure.466  Further, the protection of minority 
interests through republican government represented a major theme of early 
America.467  In Kelo, this scenario played out when the Court deferred to 
legislative determinations of public use, specifically noting that the states 
retained the power to substantively change the level of protection for 
private property.468  In response, almost every state legislature reevaluated 
its laws regarding eminent domain.469  In this way, the Court’s ruling 
allowed individuals to participate in deciding the appropriate level of 
substantive property protection. 
When public use is the deciding factor in the validity of a taking, both 
broad interpretations and narrow ones have line drawing problems.470  The 
use versus purpose distinction is simply not always clear or easy to apply in 
practice.  Protection of property through legislative deference places the 
power in the hands of the people to decide what warrants substantive 
protection, while preserving judicial oversight for instances in which the 
process failed to protect an individual.  Interpreting current public use 
jurisprudence in this manner seems far more consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment’s emphasis on procedure and early Americans’ goals for 
democratic government, while also remaining far simpler than searching for 
a coherent explanation of the inconsistent history of the Public Use Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
The government’s power to take an individual’s private property for 
public use, provided just compensation is paid to the owner, highlights the 
tenuous boundary between individual rights and the common good.  While 
 
 464. Despite Professor Monaghan’s warning that “[o]riginalism must refer to an 
understanding concrete enough to provide a real and constraining guidance,” this Note must 
reconcile the history and the methodology at a conceptually broader level since there is no 
clear and concrete understanding of the original meaning of public use. See supra note 41. 
 465. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 466. The current Fifth Amendment contains the Grand Jury Clause, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause. U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
 467. See supra notes 292–94, 345–47 and accompanying text; see also WOOD, 
RADICALISM, supra note 224, at 322–23 (“Protecting private property and minority rights 
from the interests of the enhanced public power of the new republican governments 
eventually became . . . the great problem of American democratic politics.”). 
 468. See supra notes 102–03, 108 and accompanying text. 
 469. Ely, Jr., supra note 103, at 133–34; Somin, supra note 103, at 2102. 
 470. See, e.g., supra notes 391, 399 (offering examples of line drawing problems 
identified by Mill Act courts). 
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the majority’s opinion in Kelo did not stray from public use precedent, 
Justice Thomas’s dissent chastised the Court for abandoning the original 
meaning of the Public Use Clause.  This Note suggested that Justice 
Thomas’s interpretation of the Clause’s original meaning is not foolproof.  
The historical record and the scholarship interpreting it show that the 
founding generation did not possess a definite conception of how far the 
government’s power of eminent domain extended.  Accordingly, this Note 
proposed that traditional originalist Constitutional interpretation is ill suited 
for a documentary provision with an ambiguous history, primarily because 
the historical record may be cited selectively in support of either a broad or 
narrow “original” meaning.  Simply put, original interpretation in a 
historical grey area fails to achieve the doctrine’s goals of limiting personal 
influence on judicial decision making. 
This Note concluded by proposing that originalism as an idea can be 
reconciled with the history of the Public Use Clause.  Specifically, when the 
Kelo majority stressed that state legislatures could grant more substantive 
protection to property owners, the resulting changes in state eminent 
domain law epitomized the virtues of the federal republic created by the 
founding fathers.  Localities were able to choose the appropriate level of 
substantive protection for property rights with the Constitution providing a 
minimum level of process protection.  In this way, the Kelo decision’s 
adherence to stare decisis actually exemplified the original goals of the 
founding generation. 
 
